18.11.2026 16:12

Diversification through the lens of resilience

Großbritannien International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Autor nicht angegeben
The European Commission is due to present its DiversifyEU package in December 2026, potentially requiring businesses in strategic sectors to broaden their supplier base. The article argues that diversification alone cannot guarantee resilience, citing Europe’s energy dependence and China’s dominance in green technologies and critical-mineral processing as examples of hidden vulnerabilities. It calls for the EU to pair any obligations with investment, incentives, alternative industrial capacity and closer government–business cooperation, including shared information and risk-sharing.
KI-Zusammenfassung

As the EU prepares its DiversifyEU package, simply broadening the supplier base will not necessarily make supply chains more resilient. Genuine economic resilience will require an ecosystem approach that addresses hidden dependencies, builds alternative industrial capacity and aligns government and business incentives through closer cooperation and shared investment.

In December 2026, the European Commission will present the DiversifyEU package. As part of the European Union’s efforts to reduce economic dependencies, Brussels will unveil a country-agnostic diversification instrument, strongly shaped by the current EU–China trade negotiations, which would compel businesses in strategic sectors such as chemicals and industrial machinery to diversify their supplier base. As President Ursula von der Leyen put it in her State of the Union speech on 16 September, ‘The principle is simple – no critical dependence on a single supplier’. Hardening the home front and reducing domestic vulnerabilities would strengthen Brussels’ position in the trade negotiations with Beijing. Details are still scarce, but earlier reporting indicated that companies might be required to source components from at least three suppliers, with ceilings of 30–40% for any one supplier.

How ‘diversification’ is operationalised is key. It is not about phasing out a single supplier or setting a threshold but treating it as a measure of resilience: building an entire ecosystem resilient enough to withstand external shocks and adapt to new ones.

Lessons learned from 2022

Russia’s weaponisation of energy flows in 2022 was a wake-up call for Europe on the need to diversify. In a rare geo-economic act, Brussels leveraged the power of the single market by launching joint gas-purchasing platforms, establishing solidarity mechanisms (a coordinated response to tackle severe gas shortages through reallocation of supplies and risk-sharing), mandating strategic stockpiles and strengthening critical-infrastructure protection. Through this, the EU substantially reduced its reliance on Russian energy, with the Russian share of EU gas imports falling from 45% in 2022 to 12% in 2025, and that of oil imports from 27% in early 2022 to 2% in 2026.

Since then, the EU has let its guard down on keeping its energy systems resilient. As reported by the European Court of Auditors, decoupling from Russia has been stalling. Despite the obligation to hold gas inventories at roughly 90% of storage capacity ahead of winter, the EU as a whole stood at 74% in October 2026, with Germany and Austria only slightly above 60%, leaving the Union vulnerable to price surges and market shocks. Worse still, eliminating Russian imports counts under the EU as having ‘diversified’, even if it remains heavily dependent on another supplier. In 2026, almost 58% of all European liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports originated in the United States. While geopolitical risks associated with the US and Russia differ substantially, import diversification must be assessed against the resilience of the entire energy system, not simply the nationality of suppliers.

The disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz reinforced the lesson that adding another supplier does not equate to energy resilience. When the 2026 US–Israel war with Iran began the EU was better prepared than in 2022, but the war exposed a new risk: dependence on global LNG supplies prone to disruption. The EU’s new energy strategy therefore moved away from diversification towards onshoring domestic capacity, primarily through decarbonisation and electrification. Yet this approach has ushered the Union into a new dependency on China’s green technologies and batteries. China now produces around 80% of the world’s solar panels, 80% of lithium-ion battery cells and 70% of electric vehicles, all of which are necessary for a green transition. Beijing’s expanding restrictions on critical minerals and rare earths, indispensable for the manufacturing of green technologies and batteries, exacerbate that dependency.

Europe’s response to energy weaponisation in 2022 informs how the Union now intends to address its reliance on Chinese critical minerals. This diversification process is more complicated, however: it will require sustained public financing, price guarantees and long-term offtake agreements, and will take at least a decade. The consequences of being cut off from critical minerals and clean technologies are less immediate than for oil and gas, but deeper and more structural. Beijing maintains a near-monopoly over the midstream segment of the supply chain, from refining to processing. Unlike in most commodity markets, China also exerts influence over pricing and market infrastructure, amplifying its strategic leverage.

Challenges in implementation

In May 2026 Executive Vice-President of the European Commission Stéphane Séjourné called on business to re-evaluate its exposure: ‘Too few businesses in Europe integrate the geopolitical risks, the supply chain risks into their thinking’. But a top-down obligation, while it may force companies to broaden their supplier base, carries many hidden risks. Without examining dependencies further upstream, where choke points can emerge in unexpected places, diversifying direct suppliers will not necessarily ensure greater resilience. Seemingly peripheral inputs such as sulphuric acid, which is a critical input in metal processing; petrochemicals; batteries; and semiconductor manufacturing could become the next supply-chain pressure point. China has recently announced export restrictions on tunnel-boring machines necessary for mining, and Beijing dominates 70% of the global share of specialised industrial equipment.

Diversification could also turn into a box-ticking exercise, in which businesses pro forma add another supplier without reducing their exposure in real terms. Many alternatives to China in Southeast Asia still carry considerable exposure where transhipment or final assembly happens. And in sectors like aerospace, alternatives that meet quality and performance requirements are lacking, and timelines do not match.

The US example is instructive. Effective 1 January 2027, the US Department of War will prohibit companies from procuring or selling certain covered materials such as neodymium-iron-boron magnets, tungsten metal powder, and molybdenum either mined, refined, processed or produced in China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. However, the US Aerospace Industries Association warned in October that compliant aerospace-grade supply remains unavailable for some of these materials; that transition timelines (for domestic production) exceed the statutory deadlines; and that overall significant domestic processing, refining and magnet-production capacity is not expected before at least 2028.

DiversifyEU within the broader toolbox

The current debates around DiversifyEU appear to favour obligations over incentives. There are discussions of using tariffs or making access to public procurement and subsidies conditional on diversification, but the threat of tariffs would hardly make companies diversify. As BusinessEurope put it in October: ‘If no viable alternative exists, they raise input costs for European industry without reducing dependence, and they invite retaliation, including restrictions on critical inputs’. Nokia pointed out that imposing tariffs ‘before alternative sources exist merely penalises trusted vendors and inflates costs for critical digital infrastructure’, much like the US ban on Huawei 5G equipment in 2018, when no alternatives were available.

Whether tariffs will be part of the diversification instrument remains ambiguous, but the European industry’s feedback on DiversifyEU is clear: businesses broadly support reducing strategic dependencies, but want diversification made commercially viable rather than another layer of regulatory obligations.

To facilitate diversification, the EU should pair it with other tools in its toolbox: trade and industrial policy, investment screening and a solidarity mechanism.

The EU should use trade agreements and strategic partnerships to open access to alternative suppliers, reduce barriers and support investments in partner countries. But market access alone does not create resilient supply chains. Investment in processing, infrastructure and industrial capacity is necessary to reduce dependencies, rather than simply redistributing them.

Investment screening also has a role in assessing who controls strategic assets and technologies. Both the Russian and Chinese cases showed that a supply chain could look diversified on a map while remaining concentrated in strategic terms. In 2022, Germany woke up not only to a disrupted energy supply but also to the fact that Moscow controlled key energy assets and critical infrastructure. The authorities used an amended energy-security law to place them under temporary management. Since then, several EU member states and the United Kingdom have retaken strategic assets from Chinese control, including British Steel, Italian Pirelli and the ongoing Dutch efforts to protect Nexperia. Chinese ownership of critical minerals in third countries also needs to be considered. Apparent geographical diversification does not eliminate geopolitical risk: Chinese companies control the majority of both Indonesia’s nickel-refining capacity and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s cobalt production.

The proposed solidarity mechanism should complement these measures rather than merely compensate companies caught in trade retaliation. Reframed around risk- and burden-sharing, it could support alternative capacity in Europe and trusted third countries through public guarantees, demand aggregation and long-term offtake agreements. Where justified, support could also address long project lead times and higher operating costs. This matters for sectors such as wind power, where more expensive inputs could undermine both affordable renewable energy and European manufacturers’ competitiveness. Public and private risks must be shared appropriately.

In the long term, the journey towards resilience should start inside companies. That requires a shift in mindset from ‘just in time’ to ‘just in case’, where redundancy is seen not only as a cost but as an investment in economic security. Despite a series of geopolitical crises, many businesses still lack supply-chain visibility beyond the first layer. It should be seen in firms’ own interests to phase out vulnerabilities, and DiversifyEU can help incentivise this. The Commission’s proposed Economic Security Information Hub, Supply Chain Alert Notification system and European Critical Raw Materials Centre could help institutionalise secure, two-way exchanges.

Outlook

As I argue in The Rise of Economic Statecraft: Implications for Governments and the Private Sector, effective economic security depends on the quality of government–industry cooperation. Neither governments nor businesses hold a full picture on supply-chain intelligence, so dialogue is critical. Businesses understand their suppliers and operational vulnerabilities whereas governments possess intelligence on geopolitical threats and economic coercion. Without systematic information sharing, genuine supply-chain diversification is not possible. DiversifyEU will be judged by whether it can bridge this government–industry divide and strike a workable governance bargain. A purely voluntary approach may leave systemic vulnerabilities unresolved, while an overly prescriptive one could raise costs and undermine competitiveness. Europe’s challenge is not simply persuading companies to abandon risky suppliers. It is to make resilience part of corporate decision-making while simultaneously sharing the costs of paying an economic-security premium.

The author(s) used AI ChatGPT in the initial research for this publication, to analyse more than 200 feedback submissions from businesses on the DiversifyEU package. All content has been verified by a human, and undergone a thorough editorial process and peer review by IISS subject-matter experts. The authors/IISS take full responsibility for the originality and accuracy of this publication.


https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/11/diversification-through-the-lens-of-resilience