17.11.2026 13:11

A new phase in China’s cross-strait integration strategy

Großbritannien International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Autor nicht angegeben
From 2023 to September 2026, China’s local governments sharply expanded policies and events intended to attract Taiwanese residents and businesses and foster a shared identity, according to data collected by the IISS across 31 administrative divisions. Activities rose 84% from 180 in 2023 to 332 in 2024, then totaled 305 in 2025 and 306 in the first nine months of 2026; that year, every division recorded activity, with a growing focus on cultural exchanges, AI and advanced manufacturing. The expansion suggests the CCP continues to see local integration efforts as a means of pursuing “peaceful reunification” alongside military modernisation and grey-zone activity around Taiwan.
KI-Zusammenfassung

Between 2023 and 2026, local governments have carried out an increasing number of policies and events to attract Taiwanese businesses and residents to China, suggesting the CCP’s continuing belief in achieving unification without large-scale military force.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long attempted to win over Taiwan’s population and better integrate its citizens and businesses with China in a variety of ways. Beginning in the late 1980s, initiatives encouraged Taiwanese people to visit relatives in China and offered tax breaks and investment support to Taiwanese entrepreneurs if they relocated. Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, these attempts continued, with preferential economic measures announced in 2018 and Xi’s expansion of the United Front Work Department leading to additional influence operations targeting Taiwanese social and religious organisations.

In 2023, a new phase of cross-strait integration initiatives began. Building on the pilot zone established in Fuzhou in 2009, the CCP announced plans in September 2023 to make Fujian ‘a demonstration zone for integrated development with Taiwan’. This encouraged officials to devise initiatives for deepening cross-strait integration. These were events and policies that aimed to attract Taiwanese businesses and residents to relocate to Fujian as well as promote a shared cultural identity. The CCP hopes such activities can help achieve ‘reunification’ without large-scale military action.

Since 2023, analysis has primarily focused on cross-strait integration activities in Fujian province, despite the dramatic expansion of such activities carried out all across China by local governments. The IISS has collected data on cross-strait integration events and policies that have taken place in China’s 31 administrative divisions between January 2023 and September 2026. These comprise China’s 22 provinces, five autonomous regions and four directly administered municipalities (excluding the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao).

Between 2023 and 2024, there was an 84% increase in cross-strait integration activities carried out by China’s local governments. Activity has remained high since, with 2026 on course to surpass 2024 as a record year. During this period, cross-strait integration activities have also become more widely distributed across China’s administrative divisions, with 2026 being the first year in which all divisions recorded activity, suggesting growing interest among local officials outside Fujian. There has also been a shift towards encouraging more cross-strait cultural integration activities, as well as specifically targeting artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced manufacturing sectors for cross-strait exchanges.

These numbers indicate a significant and possibly growing interest across the Party-State in carrying out more cross-strait integration activities. This may be due to local officials responding to recent signals from the senior leadership encouraging more widespread implementation of such activities. The annual Taiwan Work Affairs Conference has placed greater emphasis on such measures each year, and the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–30) encouraged officials to ‘introduce and implement measures that benefit Taiwan compatriots and enterprises’. These signals may indicate the CCP’s continuing interest in cross-strait integration activities that support its ambition for ‘peaceful reunification’ while it simultaneously modernises the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and expands grey-zone activities around Taiwan.

Alternatively, knowing the importance the central government attaches to cross-strait integration initiatives, local governments may be using these initiatives as a way to gain recognition from Beijing and advance their own ambitions. Since 2025, more provinces have hosted cross-strait forums to attract Taiwanese investment and young workers to local electric-vehicle (EV) and AI firms. Labelled as advancing cross-strait integration by local officials, these forums likely not only raise the chances of attracting Taiwanese funding and talent but also help gain the attention and possibly resources of the central government. Such attention may advance the promotion prospects of local officials. This desire for attention may partly explain why some local officials have begun diversifying the types of cross-strait integration activities carried out in their areas this year, experimenting with unique initiatives.

Growing interest across all administrative divisions

Between 2023 and 2024, the total number of cross-strait integration activities increased significantly from 180 to 332, marking a new phase in China’s cross-strait integration strategy. Although there was a slight decrease to 305 activities in 2025, 306 activities have already been recorded between January and September 2026. The decrease in 2025 was mainly due to fewer policies announced by China’s administrative divisions that aimed to achieve cross-strait integration (51 in 2024, 35 in 2025 and 12 in 2026). In 2026, this reduction in policy activity has been offset by a sizeable increase in the number of events, exchanges and local tours held to foster greater economic and cultural integration.
This is further highlighted by the increasingly widespread distribution of cross-strait integration activities across China’s 31 administrative divisions since 2024 (see Table 1). Although 21 of the divisions increased their activity between 2023 and 2024, the five most active areas (Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei, Sichuan and Shandong) accounted for almost two-thirds of the increase. Since then, however, the share of activity carried out by the five most active administrative divisions has declined steeply from 52% in 2024 to 40% in 2026.

The increase in activity between 2025 and 2026 has largely been driven by more activity in areas that previously recorded the lowest levels of activity (see Table 2). The ten least active administrative divisions in 2023 and 2024 combined accounted for 5.1% of total activity. This same group of divisions then increased their share to 13.1% in 2025 and 21.9% in 2026. Jiangxi and Henan had the largest increases, mainly through holding more activities aiming to attract and integrate more Taiwanese businesses as well as promote local culture. Henan also began inviting Taiwanese journalists to the province for tours of its dynastic history as well as for exchanges with Chinese journalists.

Cross-strait economic integration

The primary focus each year has been on events and policies that aim to attract or better integrate Taiwanese businesses into China’s economy (see Table 3). In 2024, for instance, 121 activities were undertaken towards this goal by 29 administrative divisions, with Henan and Tibet recording none. Although the total proportion of activities dedicated to attracting and integrating Taiwanese businesses has declined, it remained the largest category in 2026, almost ten percentage points ahead of the next largest category. During this period, there has also been a consistent focus among local governments on programmes that offer jobs or internships to young Taiwanese citizens. Activities fostering exchanges in the agriculture and fisheries sectors have also remained at a relatively high level, particularly in Fujian province, which in 2026 offered more trading opportunities for Taiwanese fishermen.
Since 2023, there has been a notable shift in the specific industries local officials are targeting for cross-strait economic integration (see Figure 1). In 2023 and 2024, more events centred on finance, investment and traditional manufacturing than previously. For example, the annual Anhui–Taiwan Advantageous Industries Cooperation Promotion Conference brought together provincial officials and Taiwanese enterprises with the goal of deepening industry integration. In 2024, the two sides signed agreements for 47 Taiwan-funded manufacturing projects, with a total investment of 10.05 billion yuan (US$1.4bn).
More recently, attention has shifted to the digital economy and emerging technologies, including AI, EVs and new energy vehicles. By 2025, the proportion of schemes related to emerging technology had tripled from 5% to 15%, and events that had previously centred on traditional manufacturing began to include elements of these industries in their annual meetings. For instance, in 2025, the annual Jiangsu–Nanjing Taiwan Week included drone demonstrations and robot-dog technology showcases.

Shift towards cultural integration

Over the last four years, there has been a shift across all administrative divisions towards undertaking more cross-strait cultural-integration activities. In 2024 and 2025, local governments significantly increased the number of exchange events, forums and tours held for Taiwanese citizens that promoted their respective areas’ culture and history.

Events categorised as cross-strait cultural-integration activities differ from ordinary tourism opportunities in several ways. Firstly, they are used by local youth groups to try to build connections with young Taiwanese citizens through shared experiences at sporting or religious events. Secondly, these experiences aim to cultivate a common cross-strait identity through visits to deliberately chosen sites of historical or cultural significance. Such visits are also used, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, to promote the CCP’s policies in these regions. Thirdly, these events commonly arrange for Taiwanese students and employees based in the area to meet with visiting tour groups and share ‘experiences of entrepreneurship, employment, study and life’ locally. They also often showcase an area’s recent economic success in advanced manufacturing or technology. These events are therefore carefully organised to advance cross-strait relationships and understanding rather than simply provide Taiwanese citizens with the opportunity to visit parts of China.

The growing focus on cross-strait cultural integration has also led to the implementation of a broader range of cultural initiatives. Between 2023 and 2025, cross-strait sport and cultural exchanges increased as a proportion of total activity by 162%. These events mainly host Taiwanese youths for competitions against local Chinese teams and are followed by activities promoting an area’s culture and history. The most common sporting competitions are in baseball (24%), winter sports (23%), martial arts (18%) and softball (13%).

Guangdong province has held more than 30 such competitions since 2023, making up 14% of its total cross-strait integration activity in 2023 and 35% in 2026 – almost 2.5 times the national average. Its competitions include the annual cross-strait baseball league finals, which in 2025 attracted more than 500 participants from Taiwan. The event uses sport to foster connections with Taiwanese youth while showcasing the province’s history and employment opportunities.

New areas of focus in 2026

In 2026, there was a significant increase in the number of activities held to promote exchanges in creative industries such as art, dance, film, literature and music, as well as cross-strait exchanges between ethnic-minority and indigenous communities. The proportion of activities involving the latter increased from 2.7% of all activity in 2024 to nearly 5% in 2026. These activities were concentrated in Guizhou and Yunnan provinces, accounting for 19.2% and 25% of their respective total cross-strait integration activities compared to 4.9% nationally. Guizhou, for instance, annually hosts the Guizhou–Taiwan Ethnic Cultural Exchange Symposium, which includes ancestral worship, and studies of ecological and tea culture. It also often promotes the province’s ethnic diversity, hoping to appeal to Taiwan’s indigenous groups and foster a shared ‘Chinese national community’.

Cross-strait medical exchanges have also more than doubled in proportion between 2025 and 2026, and have expanded to target more fields such as biomedicine, health and wellness, and traditional Chinese medicine (TCM). Schemes encourage Taiwanese doctors and students to visit local hospitals and other medical facilities to learn more about their practices as well as the history of TCM. In May 2026, Guizhou province invited Taiwanese doctors to take part in a scheme offering free cataract surgery for more than 100 patients and to exchange technical expertise. These activities complement Xi’s national strategy to promote TCM and the importance of Chinese traditional culture.

Provincial specialisation

There is a strong similarity between most administrative divisions in the focus of their cross-strait integration activities. In 2025, the two most common types of cross-strait integration activity nationally were also the two most common types in 89% of administrative divisions. This, however, decreased to 81% in 2026, and there are some initial signs that administrative divisions are beginning to specialise in certain cross-strait integration activities. Sichuan province, for instance, holds three times as many cross-strait religious and ancestor worship events than the national average, and Anhui province focuses more heavily than others on hosting events to increase cross-strait exchanges in the advanced-manufacturing and technology sectors.

This growing regional specialisation may be evidence of local officials using cross-strait integration activities to complement their other local policy priorities or gain central-government attention for them. Most cross-strait cultural activities in Sichuan province work to promote the province’s links to Leizu and Nezha folk culture, which complements the province’s other policy priorities of boosting local tourism and promoting Chinese fine traditional culture. Similarly, in Anhui, cross-strait economic integration events have encouraged Taiwanese investment into the province’s EV sector. This is likely to support local officials’ strategy to establish Anhui as the leading province for EV production.

Implementing unique cross-strait integration schemes may also be an effective way for local officials to gain the attention of the central government over other competing administrative divisions. This may explain why Guizhou in 2026 made the decision to invite indigenous Taiwanese communities for the first time to its annual Miao fashion show. The event subsequently gained the attention of the national Taiwan Affairs Office and was more widely reported in state media. Should regional specialisation and experimentation continue to grow in 2027, it is important to consider the extent to which local political priorities are driving this trend.

Heilongjiang and anti-Japan specialisation

In 2025, China’s national government held several events to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of Japan’s rule over Taiwan. Local governments responded by hosting Taiwanese citizens on local tours and at events that highlighted Japan’s behaviour in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). The proportion of cross-strait integration activity dedicated to promoting anti-Japanese sentiment increased from 0.6% in 2024 to 3.3% in 2025. Heilongjiang province contributed significantly to this increase, and some evidence suggests it is now specialising in these types of activities.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Heilongjiang fell under Japanese control and was home to Unit 731, which carried out chemical-weapons attacks against Chinese citizens. Events for visiting Taiwanese tour groups have included talks with Chinese war veterans and visits for Taiwanese children to the Northeast Martyrs Memorial Hall, the Exhibition Hall of Evidences of Crime Committed by Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army, and the Daqing Iron Man Memorial Hall. In one instance, a veteran presented children with calligraphy that promoted ‘peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait’. Although at a reduced rate, these activities have continued in 2026, including a visit by a delegation of 52 ethnic-minority Taiwanese citizens to Harbin for a historical study tour. Outside Heilongjiang, other local governments have also increasingly incorporated visits to anti-Japanese war monuments and museums into their tours promoting their local culture and history to Taiwanese citizens since 2025.

Strategic implications

Since 2023, local officials have carried out an increasing number of events and policies aimed at attracting more Taiwanese residents and businesses to China and fostering a shared cultural identity. The increasingly widespread distribution of these activities across the 31 administrative divisions examined suggests that the CCP leadership is actively encouraging their implementation and that there are strong political incentives for local officials to respond. Senior officials may also be either permitting or encouraging the increasing diversity of these cross-strait integration activities, with some evidence in 2026 of provinces specialising in certain types of activities or devising their own approaches.

It is unclear how CCP leadership judges the success of these activities. The considerable attention and resources devoted to them across the Party-State, however, suggest senior officials still believe they may help achieve a form of ‘peaceful reunification’ in the medium to long term. As China develops its grey-zone activities around Taiwan and continues to modernise the PLA, analysis of these local cross-strait integration activities serves as a useful measure of the CCP’s belief in a peaceful-reunification strategy. While the pace of implementation does not appear to have slowed down in this year, it is possible that Beijing may examine the outcome of Taiwan’s presidential elections in 2028 to assess whether these cross-strait integration activities have fostered more positive views of China in Taiwan.

This is part one of an IISS series examining China’s cross-strait integration strategy. Part two will explore the Taiwanese businesses and individuals participating in these cross-strait integration activities and part three will investigate the local political drivers encouraging local officials to carry out more activities.


https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/11/-a-new-phase-in-chinas-cross-strait-integration-strategy