U.S.–PRC Competition Enters New Phase in Central Asia

Executive Summary U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent visit to Uzbekistan marked Washington’s most concrete push yet to compete with Beijing in Central Asia, especially on critical minerals and connectivity.

• Rubio emphasized that Washington would not force Tashkent to choose between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), unlike the more confrontational approach of the first Trump administration.
• U.S. outreach to Uzbekistan still trails PRC engagement. The PRC announced $60 billion in investment in Uzbekistan just before Rubio’s visit, as compared to a possible $16 billion in deals signed during the U.S.–Uzbekistan meetings. The same lag appears in the U.S. priority sector of critical minerals. The United States imports around 2 percent of the region’s critical minerals, while the PRC imports nearly 50 percent.

Far from the geopolitical flashpoints of the Persian Gulf and Ukraine, double-landlocked Uzbekistan has become a new arena for competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On October 20, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in Samarkand, accompanied by an American business delegation totaling over 200 people (Daryo, October 14). On the city’s historic central square, Rubio said in his speech that “we’re here now” to advance U.S.–Uzbekistan connectivity, just as the historic Silk Road brought global trade through the region (U.S. Embassy in the PRC, October 20).

The PRC has spent decades investing in reinvigorating the very trade routes Rubio invoked. He recognized in a response to a local journalist that “it’s a competition,” but that American businesses should “have a fair shot to compete” (U.S. Embassy in the PRC, October 20). Anticipating Washington’s overtures, Beijing dispatched Premier Li Qiang (李强) to Tashkent three days before Rubio’s speech. For the PRC, Uzbekistan is a critical partner in its efforts to connect Eurasia. For the United States, the region’s potentially vast critical mineral deposits offer an opportunity to diversify supply chains and reduce its frontier technology sector’s dependence on Chinese components (RFE/RL, October 21).

Competition Overshadows Other Interests

Rubio’s visit marked a change in regional strategy since President Donald Trump’s first term. In 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo drew attention to the PRC’s mistreatment of Uyghurs and Kazakhs as a potential wedge between Central Asia and the PRC (Current Time, February 2, 2020). Fears of this binary approach recently resurfaced in the summer when the State Department sought to force Kazakhstan to choose between the United States’s Pax Silica initiative and PRC’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (RFE/RL, September 17).

The October visit presented a less confrontational approach. Rubio acknowledged that “Uzbekistan has been clear that they want to be friends with everybody,” but said that the United States does not wish to force Uzbekistan to stop talking to somebody else or stop working with some other country (U.S. Embassy in the PRC, October 20). This suggests a U.S. recognition that Central Asian governments have become more capable geostrategic players in their own right. They can now effectively wield leverage to gain favorable relations with a wider range of actors than at any point since the collapse of the Soviet Union, including among themselves (Times of Central Asia, September 23).

Washington is seeking to challenge Beijing’s dominance in Central Asia in critical minerals. After a regional minerals dialogue in 2024 and a White House summit in 2025, the United States signed a new investment framework with Uzbekistan in February 2026, targeting mineral exploration, extraction, and processing, along with plans for a joint investment company (Reuters, February 18).

Rubio’s visit was the next test of whether Washington could turn those ambitions into tangible investment. Nearly 300 representatives of American businesses accompanied him and announced potential deals worth around $12 billion (Kun, October 25). Local media reports that almost 54 agreements were signed, including plans involving GE Aerospace, railway equipment manufacturer Wabtec, financial institutions such as Citigroup and BlackRock, and companies active in mineral development (Gazeta, October 19). Surprisingly, the joint statement issued after the visit failed to mention critical minerals specifically.

The statement emphasized supporting the development of Central Asian economies. It singled out the U.S. goal of helping Central Asia achieve its “export potential” by “developing innovative ways to increase value-added products within the region and [create] pathways to introduce these products to the international market” (Department of State, October 19). It also added that the United States seeks to “foster a region where e-commerce flourishes, innovative solutions abound, and talented entrepreneurs thrive” by leveraging “secure and trusted technology, American technological excellence, and the growing technology sectors of Central Asia.”

PRC–Central Asia Relations Exceed U.S. Outreach

Even if realized, U.S. investments trail significantly behind the $60 billion that the PRC promised three days before the highly anticipated U.S. visit (President of Uzbekistan, October 17). This disparity also shows up in the critical minerals sector. The United States imports just 2.1 percent of the region’s critical minerals, according to the Oxus Society’s Central Asia Resource Tracker, while the PRC imports almost 50 percent (Oxus Society, accessed October 26).

The pattern extends to broader trends in PRC–Central Asian trade, which topped $100 billion for the first time in 2025, of which Uzbekistan accounted for $16 billion (Xinhua, January 18). In the broader region, the PRC is also the largest trade partner for isolated Iran and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 23, 2023).

Model of the BYD Car Factory in Jizzakh Free Economic Zone displayed in the Tashkent Islamic Civilization Center

(Source: Author’s photograph)

Tashkent sees the PRC as being essential to its modernization. Beijing is investing in renewable energy and advanced manufacturing, and is spearheading major infrastructure projects such as the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway (Xinhua, October 18). During a recent visit to Tashkent, the authors saw how prominently these investments feature in the country’s vision for the future. Inside the lavish, marble-clad, $150 million Center for Islamic Civilization, exhibits showcase Chinese-backed projects across Uzbekistan, including a scale model of BYD’s auto factory in the southern Jizzakh region. The exhibits illustrated how much the Uzbek government is promoting the PRC’s investments as part of its broader development ambitions.

During his meeting with Li Qiang on October 17, President Mirziyoyev described Uzbekistan–PRC relations as enjoying a “golden age,” a phrase he had previously used in conversations with General Secretary Xi Jinping. He also reaffirmed Tashkent’s support for the PRC’s One-China policy and Beijing’s efforts to combat what Chinese officials call the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism (South China Morning Post [SCMP], October 18).

In an interview with the South China Morning Post, Zhu Yongbiao (朱永彪), a regional specialist at Lanzhou University, emphasized the breadth of the PRC’s commercial offerings, ranging from electric vehicles and renewable energy to ordinary manufactures. He argued that Chinese firms could provide products and solutions suited to individual Central Asian markets, which is “an advantage the U.S. simply lacks” (SCMP, October 18).

Model of New Tashkent Displayed at the Center of Islamic Civilization in Tashkent

(Source: Author’s photograph)

Conclusion

Chinese commentary on Rubio’s visit has so far combined recognition of Washington’s growing ambitions in Central Asia with skepticism about its capacity to act on them. In the lead-up to the trip, Zhang Jiadong (张家栋), a professor at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, argued that the U.S. was merely a “distant friend” (远方朋友) to the region (Global Times, October 19).

Central Asian governments welcome Washington’s engagement because it gives them greater leverage with the PRC. Unless U.S. investment follows, though, Washington will remain a “distant friend,” lagging the PRC in influence and access.

https://jamestown.org/u-s-prc-competition-enters-new-phase-in-central-asia