20.11.2026 02:56

Slovakia Restarts Intergovernmental Consultations with Russia

USA Jamestown Unknown author
On October 26, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár led the first Slovak–Russian Intergovernmental Commission meeting since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, focusing on energy exports and potential cooperation. Prime Minister Robert Fico praised the talks, while opposition parties condemned them; Blanár said Slovakia would honor its EU and NATO commitments while pursuing cooperation with Moscow where possible. Slovakia remains reliant on Russian oil and gas, and the governments committed to holding another commission meeting in 2027, ahead of Slovakia’s expected September 2027 parliamentary elections.
AI summary

Slovakia held formal intergovernmental consultations with Russia for the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, focusing on energy imports as Bratislava remains heavily reliant on Russian oil and gas. Prime Minister Robert Fico’s Government aims to elevate bilateral relations through the Slovak–Russian Intergovernmental Commission, driven by domestic economic and electoral considerations as Slovakia heads for parliamentary elections in 2027. With former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán out of power in Hungary, the Kremlin is looking to consolidate its relationship with the Slovak leader, hoping he will break European unity on strategic issues such as Russian-European energy relations and the war against Ukraine.

On October 26, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár led a delegation of government officials to Moscow for a meeting of the Slovak–Russian Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation. The IGC focused on Russian energy exports to Slovakia and culminated in a meeting between Blanár and his Russian counterpart (STVR-Patria, October 26).

Blanár’s visit to Moscow marks the first Slovak–Russian IGC meeting since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and has been met with strong domestic reactions. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who leads a coalition government between his populist Smer party, the center-left Hlas party, and the nationalist Slovak National Party, praised the talks and Blanár’s leadership (Új Szó, October 28). The main opposition, liberal Progressive Slovakia, condemned the summit and called for Blanár’s removal. At the same time, other centrist and pro-EU opposition formations also criticized the government for prioritizing meetings with Russia instead of talks with key regional partners, including German and Polish counterparts (Új Szó, October 26).

Aside from former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Fico has been the only EU leader who has maintained close diplomatic ties with the Kremlin and has traveled to Moscow since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While Blanár’s latest trip to Moscow is a “natural” continuation of a series of bilateral trips by Slovak officials to Moscow in recent years, the restart of the IGC signals that the Slovak government is preparing to formally and permanently elevate bilateral relations even as Russia’s war against Ukraine continues. During the talks, Blanár notably said Slovakia will respect its commitments to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but will develop ties with Moscow in areas where possible in Slovakia’s national interests, pointing to future cooperation in areas unaffected by EU sanctions against the Kremlin, including the continued purchase of Russian nuclear fuel (Paraméter SK, October 26).

Given the timing, a possible rationale behind the Slovak government’s thinking is the European Union’s long-awaited decision to engage in talks with Russia over Ukraine. Even as the Kremlin has formally refused to participate, EU leaders are increasingly seen as willing to engage with Moscow to end the war against Ukraine, in parallel with U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed push for peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow (RBC-Ukraine, October 29). Fico, who did not attend the meeting, has notably used the event to advocate for direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. At the same time, Blanár offered Bratislava as a venue for lower-level meetings between Russian and Ukrainian officials (Noviny SK, October 26).

The domestic indication lies within Slovakia’s energy needs. The country remains heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas through oil deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline and a long-term gas contract running until 2034. From the Russian standpoint, the meeting likely aimed to break EU unity wherever possible, especially on gas. While EU countries are legally required to phase out all Russian gas imports by the end of 2027 under the RepowerEU Regulation, Slovakia has challenged the phase-out plan, arguing that it could cost the country an estimated 10–16 billion euros ($10.97–17.56 billion) in Russian financial claims in addition to the loss of gas imports (Noviny SK, October 26). Accordingly, Moscow likely pushed Bratislava to maintain its current stance even as the Slovak government is in talks with other possible suppliers, including the United States.

Even more important for the Kremlin is to elevate ties with the Slovak prime minister after Orbán fell out of power in Hungary’s April parliamentary elections. The new Hungarian government, led by Prime Minister Péter Magyar, has visibly downgraded relations with Moscow, seeking to decrease political influence over Budapest. With Orbán out of power, Fico is the primary EU leader whom the Kremlin aims to influence. In turn, maintaining close ties with Russia remains not only an economic but also a political interest for the Slovak prime minister, as a significant share of the Slovak electorate remains sympathetic toward Moscow (GLOBSEC, May 27, 2024). With parliamentary elections expected in September 2027, Fico aims to position himself as the “anti-war” leader maintaining stability amid an unstable geopolitical environment, likely mirroring Orbán’s April 2026 campaign rhetoric.

As 2027 approaches, Slovak–Russian relations are expected to strengthen through follow-up consultations between government officials, and the two sides have also committed to holding the next IGC in 2027. While it remains to be seen whether the Slovak opposition to the European Union’s Russian gas phase-out plan will be successful, another short-term risk stems from Slovakia’s parallel decision to restore bilateral military-diplomatic representation between Bratislava and Moscow. The Slovak government insists that the posting of a standalone Russian military attaché will not significantly change Russia’s standing (STVR, October 9). Moscow, however, could be preparing to step up its Central European intelligence operations from the Slovak capital. This comes as an increasing number of European countries are facing Russian hybrid attacks, including Slovakia, where Russian-linked figures attempted an arson attack against a Ukrainian-owned drone factory in the east of the country (Hospodarské Noviny, August 28).



https://jamestown.org/slovakia-restarts-intergovernmental-consultations-with-russia