18.11.2026 18:28

Sarmat: better late than never for Moscow

United Kingdom International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Unknown author
Satellite imagery from June 2026 suggests Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile is entering service with the 62nd Missile Division at Uzhur, eight years later than originally intended. The missile is designed to replace the ageing RS-20V and UR-100N, but its development has been marked by delays and two publicly known failed launches; its second successful test took place on 12 May 2026. Imagery from Dombarovsky also indicates preparations that could point to a third flight test, which may ease concerns about reliability, though the missile’s record remains uncertain.
AI summary

Satellite imagery suggests that Russia’s nuclear-armed RS-28 Sarmat (RS-SS-X-29) ICBM may have begun to enter service with the Strategic Rocket Forces. Further Sarmat flight trials may also take place as Moscow looks to ease its reliability concerns.

Satellite imagery from June 2026 suggests that Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat (RS-SS-X-29) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is beginning operational service with the 62nd Missile Division of the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) at Uzhur. Sarmat’s entry into service, however, is long overdue. The RVSN has extended the service life of its current liquid-fuelled ICBMs by over 20 years and has not, to public knowledge, tested them since 2013, potentially calling into question the credibility of the force’s liquid-fuelled ICBMs as a deterrent. The RVSN is, therefore, likely under increasing pressure to replace such ICBMs. Deploying Sarmat on full combat duty could start to alleviate some of this pressure.

Sarmat’s development has been problematic, marked by production delays, cancelled flight tests and, most concerning for Moscow, flight-test failures. Sarmat’s second successful launch took place on 12 May 2026, with its first occurring in 2022. In the intervening period, two launches are publicly known to have failed, each for suspected different reasons. In 2024, the missile exploded in the silo, possibly due to an engine ignition failure or malfunction. A year later, the missile successfully ejected from the silo but then inverted in the early stages of flight and crashed nearby.

Sarmat is a two-stage liquid-propelled ICBM with a post-boost phase vehicle and is intended to replace Russia’s RS-20V Voevoda (RS-SS-18 Satan Mod 5) and UR-100N (RS-SS-19 Stiletto Mod 4) ICBMs. Sarmat may carry up to 15 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles or potentially multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

Despite these difficulties, RVSN Commander Colonel General Sergey Karakayev stated that the successful test in May 2026 would enable the RVSN to put Sarmat on ‘combat duty’ later in the year. The 62nd Missile Division at Uzhur has long been the first division expected to receive Sarmat. Eight years later than intended, Sarmat now appears to be entering service.

Loading the silo

Satellite imagery captured at least six vehicles around the open silo 13C at Uzhur on 6 June 2026. What appears to be a transloader – the vehicle type used to transport and load a missile section into the silo – can be seen positioned at the silo opening. The transloader may have transported Sarmat’s second stage, the post-boost phase vehicle or the nose section. The flatbed upon which the missile is transported appears to be erected to near vertical, seemingly without a missile structure attached. The absence of the missile structure could indicate that the missile section had already been loaded into the silo.

Russian ICBMs previously seen in transit have sometimes had a red protective structure attached to the top of the missile sections. In the June 2026 satellite imagery, a red circular structure measuring approximately three metres in diameter can be seen on a vehicle parked away from the open silo. The removal of the red missile cap could again suggest that the missile section has been loaded into the silo, potentially allowing for payload integration or fuelling of the ICBM.

Fuelling is often reserved for missiles on full combat duty. A fuelled ICBM can be employed within a shorter timeframe, decreasing the likelihood of a successful strike against it. Fuelling does, however, also corrode the parts of the missile that the fuel is in contact with, despite the improved stability of Russia’s hypergolic liquid fuel. This corrosion can negatively impact the missile’s structural integrity and therefore limits how long an ICBM can remain fuelled before it needs to be de-fuelled and maintained.

There is also what appears to be a crane positioned next to the silo. Past imagery has shown cranes being used to install a payload into an RS-12M2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27 Mod 1) ICBM. The presence of a crane could therefore suggest that the Sarmat ICBM at silo 13C has a payload in place, likely a nuclear one. This may also suggest that Sarmat is on full combat duty.

Accelerated deployment

Russia’s RS-24 Yars (RS-SS-27 Mod 2), which underwent a much more straightforward development period, was put on ‘combat duty’ after three successful launches. Moscow may have wished to do the same with Sarmat but, given the ageing stocks of RS-20V and UR-100N, has instead accelerated its deployment and taken two successes as sufficient for Sarmat to begin combat duty.

A third successful flight test could ease Moscow’s reliability concerns, but such a move would come with risks. Chiefly, any level of failure could damage Sarmat’s credibility as a deterrent.

Three is the magic number

Moscow may be preparing, or could have already conducted, a third flight test of Sarmat.

Satellite imagery reveals that vehicles and machinery were often present at silo 1A of the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky, the launch site of Sarmat’s second successful flight trial, between June and early-September 2026. These vehicles may have been conducting repairs or upgrades to the silo following the May test, but their prolonged presence suggests that they were not involved in immediate preparations for a test launch.

Activity around the silo resumed around 22 October 2026 after a short hiatus. Satellite imagery appears to show an erected transloader, possibly for the second stage of the missile, positioned next to the open silo without a missile section attached. The erected portion of the transloader at Dombarovsky appears to be a frame rather than the solid flatbed seen at Uzhur. This could suggest that the vehicles transported different sections of the missile.

A longer, possibly semi-articulated transport vehicle also appears to be present further ahead of the silo. The length of the trailer could suggest that the first stage of Sarmat was transported on it.

Finally, a yellow circular frame is visible near to the silo. The frame could be a support gantry upon which people stand when guiding the missile sections into the silo and mating them together. Its presence could indicate that multiple sections of the missile were being loaded into the silo at the time.

Deterrence calculus

Sarmat is expected to provide Russia with greater range compared to its predecessor ICBMs. It may also utilise a polar or near-polar trajectory to approach the United States from the south.

Irrespective of the patchy test performance of Sarmat, the US and its allies will now have to factor this missile into Russia’s operational deterrent. Both the US and Russia, however, may still have questions about Sarmat’s reliability, given its history.


https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2026/11/sarmat-better-late-than-never-for-moscow