16.11.2026 15:49

Fragile India–Pakistan ties

Velká Británie International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Autor neuveden
India and Pakistan’s relations remain fragile 18 months after their May 2025 conflict, with hardened positions, no peace process or back channel, and little people-to-people contact raising the risk of miscalculation between the nuclear-armed neighbours. Diplomatic links and some confidence-building measures continue, including exchanges of prisoner and nuclear-installation lists, despite disputes over terrorism, Kashmir and the Indus Water Treaty. A senior Indian political leader may attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation leaders’ summit in Islamabad in August 2027, if no major terror attack intervenes, potentially creating an opportunity to ease tensions.
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Over a year on from their conflict in May 2025, India and Pakistan continue to have tense bilateral relations. Ways in which relations might improve are few but worth examining.

India–Pakistan ties remain fragile 18 months after their May 2025 conflict. With both governments professing victory in the conflict, tensions perhaps ought to have eased, at least temporarily. Instead, positions have hardened, new coercive doctrines have been declared and provocative rhetoric mutually displayed. These are compounded by the absence of a diplomatic peace process or back channel and virtually no people-to-people contact. All this makes for a destabilised relationship with higher risks of misunderstanding and misperception, which could lead to an accidental or inadvertent escalation in a future conflict between these two nuclear-armed states.

Yet bilateral diplomatic relations continue – although at a downgraded level – and select Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) hold, alongside the prospect of a senior Indian political leader’s participation at the next Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders’ summit in Islamabad in August 2027.

Introduction

The four-day May 2025 conflict was triggered by a terrorist attack on 22 April in Pahalgam, a town in India’s Kashmir Valley, which India blamed on Pakistan and marked their greatest military escalation in decades. Amid an unprecedented sea of misinformation and disinformation, both countries claimed victory along with the establishment of ‘new normals’. With India’s military operation having only paused, the next Pakistan-based terror attack would be considered an ‘act of war’, as would any Indian attempt to stop or divert the flow of water to Pakistan, to which the country pledged to respond to with ‘full force’, including through its Quid Pro Quo Plus pledge, ‘across the complete spectrum of national power’. The latter allusion to the use of nuclear weapons caused India to state that it would not give in to ‘nuclear blackmail’.

India and Pakistan seek limited options against one another, but risks are exacerbated by: both countries’ acquisition of new technologies; Pakistan being in denial over the implications of anti-India terror outfits on its territory; and India being in denial over military escalation that could lead to a devastating conflict for both. In September 2026, Indian and Pakistani warships bumped each other in the Arabian Sea, leading to mutual accusations of violation of the 1991 bilateral agreement to give each other advance notice of military exercises.

Terrorism and the Line of Control

Despite India’s bold and unprecedented counter-terrorism strikes on 7 May 2025 in Pakistan’s heartland province of Punjab, these did not impact the leadership of Islamist terror groups Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaysh-e-Mohammad, who have vowed retaliation. However, there has been no significant terror attack against India since the May conflict. It is not clear if this is due to the terror outfits seeking time to regroup or due to pressure on them by the Pakistani security establishment. The most significant terror attack since then, the car bombing near Old Delhi’s Red Fort on 10 November 2025 that killed at least 12, including the suicide bomber and injured 29 people, was attributed to an Indian homegrown terror network shaped by transnational jihadist beliefs. The most recent attack took place on 11 November 2026 in Kulgam in South Kashmir where three Indian paramilitary personnel were injured.

Despite occasional firing since May 2025 across the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Kashmir, there have been no serious incidents or casualties. This also indicates that infiltration into India has decreased, which would also naturally occur in winter. At the same time, Pakistan has blamed India for the targeted killings of several militants in Pakistan, and alleged that India continues to fund and aid the anti-Pakistan Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) through Afghanistan.

Indus River waters

In response to the Pahalgam terror attack, India announced that the 65-year-old Indus Water Treaty (IWT) for the sharing of waters between the two countries would be held in ‘abeyance’ until Pakistan ‘credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism’. Pakistan strongly rejected this decision as ‘unilateral and illegal’, as it viewed the curtailment of water as an existential threat, given that it depends on the Indus Basin for 80% of its irrigation and a third of its hydropower production.

Pakistan legally challenged India’s decision. In August 2026, the Court of Arbitration at The Hague issued an award holding that the treaty ‘remains fully in force’. It also stated that India had no unilateral right to suspend or terminate the treaty, and that none of its cited grounds of material breach (including accusations of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan) justified the abeyance. India rejected the award, calling the Court ‘illegally constituted’ and lacking jurisdiction, even though in 2014, it had accepted the Court’s ruling and implementation over conflicting maritime claims with Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal under a separate tribunal.

Nonetheless, India is not currently capable of immediately cutting off water on its three western rivers – the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum – from which most waters flow to Pakistan. At most, it could increase or reduce water flows between October and December and May and July, thereby affecting Pakistan’s irrigation planning and agriculture. Doing more would require the construction of massive new water-storage and tunnel infrastructure.

In this context, on its western rivers, India is expediting the construction of reservoir and hydropower projects that had been redesigned to store more water, but that had been previously blocked or injuncted by Pakistan under the IWT. This includes the 330 megawatt Kishanganga dam (on the Jhelum River), and the under-construction Ratle hydroelectric project (on the Chenab River) scheduled for completion in 2028. Additional hydroelectric projects on the Chenab River include the Sawalkote project, which will take nine years to build; the Pakal Dul and Kiru projects scheduled for commissioning early next year; and the Kwar project to be completed by March 2028. Moreover, bids for the construction of the Chenab–Beas Link Project (Link-3), intended to channel water from the Chenab River into the Beas River Basin to enhance domestic water availability, aid irrigation and boost hydropower generation, are to be submitted by the end of November 2026.

On its eastern rivers, India has been increasing its reservoir storage and capacity on hydroelectric construction projects. Examples include the completion of the Shahpur Kandi dam on the Punjab–Jammu and Kashmir border by April 2027, intended to stop excess waters of the Ravi River, one of the three eastern rivers from the Indus Basin, from flowing unused to Pakistan, and the Ujh storage-cum-power project underway in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

Kashmir

Since May 2025, the political discourse in J&K has focused more on reinstating statehood, a commitment made by India’s home minister Amit Shah, at the time of the August 2019 abrogation of Article 370 of the constitution, which had provided J&K with special autonomy, including their own constitution and legislative authority. This was a significant act as it brought J&K under the constitution fully, eliminating its special status and dividing the former state into two union territories of J&K and Ladakh. On 28 September 2026, the J&K Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the prompt restoration of complete statehood. As of November 2026, J&K remains a union territory, with no specific date for restoration announced.

Diplomatic ties

At the time of the April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, neither India nor Pakistan had a High Commissioner in each other’s capital, due to the recall of Pakistan’s envoy in February 2019 after the attack in Pulwama, and the expulsion of India’s envoy from Pakistan in August the same year for India’s ‘unilateral and illegal’ revoking of Article 370. The size of the diplomatic missions of both countries, already at half strength since June 2020, was further reduced from 55 to 30 staff. Pakistan also closed the Wagah border (reciprocally, after India did the same on 23 April 2025), ending all cross-border transit from India; closed its airspace to Indian-flagged aircraft (with India doing the same for Pakistani aircraft over Indian airspace); and highlighted its right to hold all bilateral agreements with India in abeyance. In addition, Pakistan’s rising profile in the Gulf region and the ongoing 2026 US–Israel war with Iran have caused India’s ties with the United States to worsen. This has been exacerbated by India’s failure to build ties with Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government in Bangladesh, which further risks reducing India’s regional influence and creates space for closer Bangladesh–Pakistan engagement.

Yet bilateral diplomatic links continue with the appointment of respective chargés d’affaires. The exchange of lists of prisoners and fishermen continues to take place via diplomatic channels, as well as the pre-notification of ballistic-missile tests. On 1 January 2026, they held their annual exchange of nuclear installation lists.

Indian and Pakistani official delegations also attend United Nations and SCO meetings, including at the ministerial level, with both participating in the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and counter-terrorism exercises such as Sahand-Antiterror-2025. The first visit of an Indian official to Islamabad since May 2025 took place in September 2026, for the first meeting of the SCO Council of National Coordinators since Pakistan began its SCO chairmanship. On 20–22 November 2026, Pakistan’s minister for climate change and environmental coordination will attend the first Civilisational Dialogue Forum of the SCO in Delhi – the first Pakistani ministerial visit in over three years. However, no bilateral discussions take place at these multilateral fora.

People to people

Traditional people-to-people contact and communication have become a major casualty since April–May 2025. For the first time in decades, the Indian government advises Indian nationals not to travel to Pakistan. Pakistan has not needed to reciprocate, as India has also revoked all existing visas on Pakistani passports. Indians and Pakistanis remain unable to access their respective mainstream daily media online while conversely receiving large doses of domestic toxic rhetoric, resulting in palpably less mutual understanding. The last India–Pakistan cricket match in either country was played on 14 October 2023. But they do play against each other in international tournaments, even if they do not shake hands before or after their matches. Nevertheless, occasional pilgrimages take place on both sides between Pakistani and Indian Sikhs and Pakistani Hindus and Indian Shia (predominantly) Muslims.

In an intriguing development, leadership of the Hindu nationalist organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – which is associated with the Bharatiya Janata Party of the ruling National Democratic Alliance – advocated ‘limited ties’ with Pakistan through people-to-people contacts and culture. In May 2026, RSS General Secretary Dattatreya Hosabale suggested maintaining diplomatic communication with Pakistan and enhancing restricted people-to-people interactions so that trade, commerce and visa exchanges might persist. The following month, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat supported Hosabale’s stance, explaining that the outreach was aimed at Pakistan’s populace rather than the validation of their government or military. This appeared to diverge from official Indian government policy.

Looking ahead

In the absence of a back channel, there is currently no prospect of the resumption of a bilateral India–Pakistan peace process. The last such composite dialogue meeting took place in December 2012, but was halted the following January by then Indian prime minister Dr Manmohan Singh after the mutilation of Indian soldiers killed on the LoC. India has not clarified the benchmarks for Pakistan to ‘credibly and irrevocably’ abjure its support for cross-border terrorism; and Pakistan’s insistence on talks with India is based on a dialogue on Kashmir, which India refuses to engage with. Yet the prospect of a senior Indian political leader’s visit to Pakistan in August 2027, dependent on the continued absence of a significant terror attack in India, could encourage the easing of tensions before India goes to polls in just over two-and-a-half years’ time.

This Online Analysis draws in part on the Strategic Comment, ‘The state of back-channel talks between India and Pakistan’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 32, no. 27, November 2026.


https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/11/fragile-indiapakistan-ties