16.11.2026 14:42

Changing partnerships between the Gulf and South Asia

Velká Británie International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Autor neuveden
The 2026 US/Israel war with Iran has accelerated new and existing partnerships between Gulf and South Asian countries. Pakistan formalised collective-defence agreements with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye and expanded regional groupings, while India deepened its UAE partnership through a strategic defence framework; India–GCC trade reached US$178.7 billion in FY2025. Both countries will remain important Gulf partners, but UAE–Pakistan and India–Saudi Arabia political ties are likely to weaken in the short term.
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While their approaches differ, India and Pakistan are increasing their cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, respectively. In the short term, however, UAE–Pakistan and India–Saudi Arabia political ties will likely diminish.

The 2026 United States/Israel war with Iran has been a catalyst for the strengthening of existing diplomatic, military and economic partnerships, and expansion into new ones, between Gulf and South Asian countries.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are vital for India and Pakistan’s energy and food security and economic growth. Both states have a large stake in Gulf stability as ten million Indian and around five million Pakistani nationals reside in the region.

Pakistan has been active in developing new partnerships and minilateral groups. Following the signing of a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement between Pakistan and its most important regional partner, Saudi Arabia, in September 2025, a separate trilateral ‘Makkah Joint Defence Agreement’, including NATO member state Türkiye, was formed in August 2026. Pakistan’s regional partnerships also include two new quadrilateral groups: the Regional Four (R4) diplomatic group with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, and a defence-industrial cooperation group with Indonesia, Qatar, and Türkiye. Therefore, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia engage bilaterally, trilaterally and in a quadrilateral group. However, each of the new groups – which seek regional ownership of security issues – is in its initial stages.

India has deepened a long-standing partnership with its own most important regional partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Notably, they signed a ‘Framework for the Strategic Defence Partnership’ in May 2026. The UAE is the only regional country India engages with bilaterally, trilaterally and, since 2021, in the I2U2 quadrilateral grouping with the US and Israel.

The changing partnerships are pragmatic responses to changing geopolitical realities. They involve a desire for regional stability, transactional interests and, with the Makkah agreement, shared threat perceptions over Israel’s and Iran’s regional policies and military conduct.

At the centre are the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia and India–UAE partnerships, but Pakistan’s and India’s approaches differ. Islamabad has been an intermediary in the US–Iran war, and its agreements include collective-defence commitments, which will increase its exposure to conflict in the Middle East. India’s partnership with the UAE – and with third countries – does not include such a commitment, and will likely not become a formal alliance due to India’s multi-alignment policy. New Delhi will not take an active military role, and is unlikely to play an intermediary role in regional conflicts.

India remains reluctant to take an active role in the complex politics of the Middle East and is back to its long-standing balancing act between the Gulf, Iran and Israel.

Although Pakistan’s profile in the Gulf has and will continue to increase, this is unlikely to have a negative impact on India’s regional profile. The trend of rising India–Gulf ties since 2015 – across political, economic and defence issues – largely at Pakistan’s expense, will continue, and India–GCC ties will remain strong overall. Therefore, despite their different approaches, Pakistan and India will both be important partners for the Gulf. However, these partnerships will weaken Pakistan–UAE and India–Saudi Arabia political relations in the short term.

Pakistan’s diplomatic role

Pakistan’s visibility and influence in the Gulf have grown due to its diplomatic role during the US/Israel–Iran war. Islamabad has sought to maintain its internal sectarian balance – its large Shia minority population is estimated at 25–40m people – and its land border with Iran. Additionally, Pakistan imports approximately 85% of its crude oil, primarily from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and is also reliant on remittances from Pakistani workers in the Gulf.

Pakistan has a vested interest in de-escalating conflict in the Gulf as its economic, energy and security interests are at stake, and it does not want to engage in a conflict with neighbouring Iran, due to its collective-defence pacts with Riyadh. Pakistan was an intermediary between the US and Iran in mid-2026, leading to the signing of the ‘Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding’ in June. However, the continued risk of conflict has resulted in Pakistan engaging in different mechanisms.

Pakistan–Saudi Arabia

The deepening of the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia partnership was formalised in the 2025 ‘Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement’. Notably, the agreement includes a collective-defence commitment, where ‘any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both’. However, this pact is ‘defensive’ and not ‘country-specific’. The agreement’s first test came after attacks against Saudi Arabia in February 2026, by the Iran-backed Ansarullah (Houthis) in Yemen. In April, Pakistan reportedly deployed at least 8,000 soldiers, aircraft and an air-defence system to Saudi Arabia.

The US/Israel–Iran war – and its impact on energy costs – has also increased Pakistan’s dependence on Riyadh’s financial support. The Saudi–Pakistan partnership, along with Saudi–UAE tensions, resulted in worsening Pakistan–UAE relations. The UAE requested sudden repayment of Pakistan’s US$3.45 billion debt in April, which Islamabad repaid with emergency support from Riyadh: a US$3bn loan and an extension of an existing US$5bn deposit to 2028. In June, a ‘comprehensive economic package’ was being finalised to strengthen trade and investment ties.

However, the Saudi–Pakistan relationship has limits. Islamabad will avoid playing an ‘offensive’ role in the Middle East, which could deepen Pakistan’s internal divisions. In 2015, following domestic pressure, Pakistan rejected a Saudi request for military support against the Houthis.

Despite the weakening of ties in the short term, Abu Dhabi will remain an important partner for Islamabad, due to Pakistan’s 1.8m expatriates in the UAE and the potential for future economic support. In 2024, the UAE pledged to invest US$10bn in Pakistan. Islamabad also needs the UAE’s approval to finalise the Pakistan–GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

Expansion into trilateral cooperation

A significant development in August 2026 was the ‘Makkah Joint Defence Agreement’ signed between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Modelled on NATO’s Article 5 agreement, the pact is ‘intended to strengthen collective deterrence … any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all’, including through ‘all means of mutual assistance’.

In August, the group established a Secretariat in Riyadh, with its first secretary-general, a retired Pakistan military official, appointed for three years. In October, the group deployed military forces from Pakistan and Türkiye to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan has insisted that the agreement is ‘defensive’, with Pakistani and Turkish forces in a supporting role. The group also met with Iranian leaders in October. The three countries are also strengthening defence-industrial cooperation. The group is likely to expand, with potential participation from Bangladesh, Egypt and Syria.

Pakistan will hope the agreement’s collective-defence commitments will deter any future India–Pakistan conflict. Islamabad would likely expect reciprocal defensive military support from Riyadh and Ankara, to match the support it has provided. At the minimum, Pakistan would want political support from its partners, including Saudi Arabia, which would likely mean Riyadh would not be neutral. This raises questions over Riyadh acting as a potential third-party facilitator, as it did with Abu Dhabi during the India–Pakistan conflicts in 2019 and 2025.

This also follows Türkiye’s support – including military support – to Pakistan in its 2025 conflict with India, and over Kashmir. This led to a weakening of the India–Türkiye relationship, with India strengthening ties with Türkiye’s neighbours, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus and Greece, in response.

Pakistan’s wider regional focus

Pakistan has also expanded its regional partners, setting up the foreign ministerial-level R4 group – with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt – in March 2026. The R4 held its sixth meeting in October and met with four European countries. If Egypt joins the Makkah agreement, however, the R4 group’s informal nature will likely become obsolete, as both groups would consist of the same four countries.

In October 2026, Indonesia, Pakistan, Qatar and Türkiye signed a defence-industrial pact – the ‘Badr Memorandum of Understanding’. This follows the signing of a defence cooperation agreement between Pakistan and Kuwait in August. Each of Pakistan’s new partnerships will take time to develop, but they illustrate the country’s growing profile in a region increasingly concerned with hard power and security.

India–UAE

In contrast, India has deepened its long-standing partnership with the UAE. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the UAE in May 2026 was his eighth since 2014. India’s foreign minister visited in April and October, its national security advisor (NSA) visited in April, and its foreign secretary in May and November. The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, also visited India in January, followed by visits of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi in February and September, the foreign minister in October and the minister of state in March.

Significantly, Modi’s visit resulted in the signing of a bilateral ‘Framework for the Strategic Defence Partnership’ focused on ‘deepening defence industrial collaboration and cooperation on innovation and advanced technology … maritime security [and] cyber defence’. However, India’s foreign secretary stated that it was not India’s ‘intent to get involved in a hypothetical future scenario in the region’. India is also seeking to increase defence exports to the UAE.

The India–UAE partnership has expanded into trilateral cooperation. There were joint India–UAE–France military exercises in 2025, and further meetings with France in May and September 2026. India and the UAE also had meetings with the US in October 2026. India’s and the UAE’s relations with Israel – India’s other main regional partner – however, have not formalised into a trilateral ministerial meeting or military exercise. During Modi’s visit to Israel in February, two geo-economic projects were discussed: the I2U2 group and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). However, both projects have been delayed by the conflicts in the Middle East.

India and Saudi Arabia’s political engagement has weakened since Modi’s April 2025 visit to Riyadh. India’s foreign minister visited Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman in July 2026, but he has not had a standalone visit to Riyadh since September 2024. India’s NSA has, however, frequently visited Riyadh – in February, April and July 2026 – to address the changing regional security situation. The Saudi foreign minister visited India in September for the BRICS summit.

The new partnerships are unlikely to weaken the India–Egypt and India–Indonesia relationships. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited India in September while Modi visited Jakarta in July, and India–Indonesia defence cooperation is strong.

Strong India–GCC ties

India’s ties are deepening across the GCC, its largest regional-bloc trade partner. India–GCC trade totalled US$178.7bn in FY2025. The UAE is India’s third-largest trade partner, worth US$100bn, and Saudi Arabia is India’s fifth-largest trade partner.

In February 2026, India and the GCC signed the Terms of Reference for an FTA. India signed a trade agreement with the UAE in 2022 and its agreement with Oman entered into force in June 2026. India is also negotiating trade agreements with Bahrain and Qatar. Additionally, India has received ambitious investment targets of US$100bn from Saudi Arabia, US$75bn from the UAE – with an additional US$5bn announced – and US$10bn from Qatar. India’s dependence on the Gulf for energy imports has also grown, with 54% of crude oil imports from the Gulf in September 2026.

This highlights the deep engagement between India and GCC countries, with the UAE relationship being India’s priority. However, to maintain the strong India–Saudi Arabia economic relationship bilateral political engagement needs to strengthen.

Outlook

The changing partnerships between the Gulf and South Asia are pragmatic responses to shifting geopolitical realities. However, Pakistan’s collective-defence commitments with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have been formalised whereas the India–UAE partnership and India’s trilateral cooperation with third countries have not (nor are likely to be for the foreseeable future).

Despite their different approaches, India and Pakistan will both be important partners for the Middle East. Pakistan’s new partnerships will take time to operationalise, but its regional profile is increasing. India–GCC ties are also strengthening overall. At the core will remain a deepening of the long-standing Saudi Arabia–Pakistan and India–UAE partnerships. In the short term, however, UAE–Pakistan and India–Saudi Arabia political ties will likely decline.


https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/11/changing-partnerships-between-the-gulf-and-south-asia