Georgia Begins De Facto Diplomatic Reset with Russia
On October 21, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze appointed First Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Zurabashvili as special representative for relations with Russia, expanding the role to include political and security issues and prompting concern that it could sideline the international Geneva talks. The article describes deepening economic, political and religious ties as Russian trade restrictions and incentives accompany Georgia’s growing dependence: Russia supplied nearly 92 percent of its wheat imports and 28 percent of its gas consumption, and bought 63.4 percent of its wine exports in the first nine months of 2026. Pro-Kremlin figures are advocating restored diplomatic relations and Georgia’s eventual entry into the Russia-Belarus Union State, while critics warn that closer ties could weaken Georgia’s negotiating position and foreign-policy independence.
Georgia’s special representative for relations with Russia, First Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Zurabashvili, now has a mandate covering security issues, which critics fear could sideline the Geneva talks and signal a de facto diplomatic reset. Moscow pairs trade restrictions with incentives as Georgia’s dependence grows, with Russia supplying nearly 92 percent of its wheat imports and 28 percent of its gas consumption and buying 63 percent of its wine exports. Pro-Kremlin figures are pushing for full diplomatic ties and even Georgia’s entry into the Union State of Russia and Belarus, while the two countries’ Orthodox churches deepen contacts.
On October 21, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze appointed Georgian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Giorgi Zurabashvili, an incumbent diplomat, as his special representative for relations with Russia (Facebook/IrakliKobakhidze, October 21). In Georgia, the move is already perceived as essentially a restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia. The Diplomatic Society of Georgia, which brings together dozens of former Georgian diplomats, described Zurabashvil’s appointment to the position, and the expansion of its powers, as a dangerous trend (Facebook/diplogeorgia, October 21).
The position of special representative was established in 2012, after the ruling Georgian Dream party came to power and sought to create an additional channel of engagement with Russia in the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries (JAM news, October 22). Initially, the format focused on resolving humanitarian and socio-economic issues. Judging by Kobakhidze’s statements, however, its agenda is now expanding to include political and security issues. On October 21, he listed the “peaceful resolution of the conflict with Russia” among the new representative’s tasks. This task has particularly alarmed Georgian experts, as it could create a mechanism that operates alongside, or potentially competes with, the Geneva International Discussions (Facebook/diplogeorgia, October 21). Launched after Russia’s military aggression against Georgia in August 2008, the Geneva talks have kept the conflict on the international agenda and prevented Georgia from being left to negotiate with Russia alone. The European Union, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) co-chair the process, while the United States participates in the international discussions. Russia has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the format. Expanding the special representative’s mandate could narrow the scope for international engagement on the conflict and shift interaction between the parties toward bilateral dialogue. Such a shift could significantly weaken Georgia’s negotiating position.
Zurabashvili will also keep his position as first deputy minister of foreign affairs (Georgia Today, October 21). This may indicate that contacts with Moscow are being coordinated at a higher institutional level and given a more official character. This amounts to deeper engagement with Russia and the establishment of a channel for political dialogue, which could be a step toward the restoration of diplomatic relations. Kobakhidze rejects the idea of restoring diplomatic relations with Russia almost every month, linking the issue to Moscow’s continued recognition of the so-called independence of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia). Even while announcing the new special representative, he reiterated that diplomatic relations with Russia would not be restored (Facebook/IrakliKobakhidze, October 21). Many in Georgia suspect that Tbilisi keeps up the appearance of diplomatic distance only in rhetoric, while relations with Russia have perhaps gone too far.
Kremlin-controlled quasi-political groups in Georgia welcomed the government’s decision enthusiastically. Georgian Solidarity for Peace party leader Mamuka Pipia, who lives in Moscow and is under U.K. sanctions, described the appointment as a de facto restoration of diplomatic relations (Netgazeti, October 27). On October 28, Pipia established the Foundation for Russian–Georgian Unity in Moscow. The foundation has already appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Georgian authorities to officially restore diplomatic relations between the two countries (Facebook/Formula, October 29). The foundation also plans to establish a Russian–Georgian university in Georgia, promoting the Russian language in the country, and strengthening religious ties (Sputnik Georgia, October 28). At Pipia’s direct initiative, Russia has already begun actively recruiting Georgian youth for an international youth festival. For the second time, 40 Georgian citizens aged 15 to 21 were selected for the festival, held in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg on September 11–17 (Radio Tavisupleba, September 16). Pipia has openly said his primary objective is to bring the two countries closer together, a process he believes should ultimately culminate in Georgia joining the Union State of Russia and Belarus (Facebook/Formula, October 29). Moscow has already welcomed the new anti-Georgian initiative. At a briefing on November 5, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova expressed her readiness to support the foundation’s initiatives. According to her, Russia “is prepared to consider specific projects that the foundation plans to implement and, if necessary, provide them with appropriate support” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 5).
Georgian law previously prohibited ministers and deputy ministers from holding another position. On October 26, after Zurabashvili’s appointment, the government therefore asked parliament to amend the law to allow the two posts to be held simultaneously (Interpressnews, October 26). Shortly before the appointment was announced, on October 9, Moscow unexpectedly restricted imports of several Georgian alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages (RBC, October 10; see EDM, November 3). Amid warming relations between Tbilisi and Moscow, the move was seen as a possible instrument of political pressure. A significant share of Georgia’s exports of alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, and mineral water goes to the Russian market, which deepens the country’s economic dependence on Russia. Wine exports provide a clear example. Georgia exported $188.7 million worth of wine in the first nine months of 2026, according to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, and $119.7 million, or 63.4 percent, went to Russia (Business Media Georgia, October 19).
Moscow’s actions appear contradictory. Despite new restrictions on certain Georgian products, Russia’s agricultural watchdog, Rosselkhoznadzor, reported on October 22 that it had reached an agreement with Georgia’s National Food Agency to expand bilateral trade in agricultural products and grant two Georgian dairy-processing enterprises access to the Russian market starting in November 2026. Georgia’s National Food Agency, however, released no information about the negotiations (Apsny, October 22).
These behind-the-scenes negotiations have attracted attention for two reasons. First, the Russian agency’s statement notes, “The Russian side has already submitted an application to the Eurasian Economic Commission to have them included in the relevant Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) register” (Apsny, October 22). Georgia is not a member of the EAEU, an organization Moscow established as a counterweight to the European Union’s Eastern Partnership program. This may be the first slip suggesting that Georgian Dream is preparing Georgia to join the union, which would effectively return the Georgian economy to a model resembling a modernized Soviet Union. Second, Rosselkhoznadzor announced on October 26 that it would visit Georgia for an inspection (Rosselkhoznadzor, October 26). Inspectors arrived in Georgia for a visit from November 2–6. They examined not only various food and agricultural products intended for export to Russia but also Georgian laboratories responsible for testing products destined for the Russian market (Rosselkhoznadzor, November 9).
Under its own legislation, Georgia officially considers Russia an occupying state, but it is welcoming inspectors from that very occupying state to check the quality of its products. According to Rosselkhoznadzor, agricultural trade between the two countries continues to grow, and Russia has increased its imports of Georgian fruit and berries in the first nine months of 2026 (Apsny, October 22). On November 9, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated that Russia welcomes the development of trade and economic cooperation with Georgia. He also emphasized that regional issues should be resolved exclusively through political and diplomatic means, without the intervention of external forces. Essentially, the Russian official expressed Moscow’s desire to limit Western interference in processes in the South Caucasus. In this context, Shoigu also emphasized the importance of resuming the work of the “3+3” regional consultative platform (Interfax, November 9). Georgia has so far refused to participate in this format, despite Moscow’s persistent efforts to secure its inclusion. Given Moscow’s persistence, it is unlikely that the Georgian Dream will not retreat from its previously stated principles and ultimately join this format, which is designed to expel Western interests from the South Caucasus and completely subordinate the region to the interests of three regional players—Russia, Turkey, and Iran.
Georgian experts assess that the Kremlin is using economic incentives to push the Georgian authorities toward further concessions. Former National Bank of Georgia President Roman Gotsiridze argues that Russia is pursuing a strategy of gradual economic expansion in Georgia, steadily increasing its presence in the Georgian market and deepening the country’s dependence on Russian resources. Gotsiridze points to Georgia’s growing dependence on Russian natural gas, which accounted for just 1.7 percent of Georgia’s total natural gas consumption in 2018 but 28 percent by 2025 (Facebook/RomanGotsiridze, October 11). The Georgian think tank Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC) warns that Georgia’s dependence on the Russian market has reached a critical level. Moscow, it argues, could exploit this dependence for political pressure, and any economic or trade manipulation by Russia could expose Georgia to serious risks. The scale of this dependence is reflected in foreign trade figures. In the first half of 2026, Georgia’s trade with Russia reached $1.53 billion, or 11.8 percent of its total foreign trade. Georgia’s reliance on Russian food and energy supplies is of particular concern. In several strategically important sectors, the country is effectively dependent on a single supplier—Russia. In January–June, Russia supplied nearly 92 percent of Georgia’s wheat imports, 98.5 percent of its flour imports, and more than 70 percent of its sunflower oil imports. Russia also dominates Georgia’s petroleum imports, accounting for 40.5 percent of its oil and petroleum product imports in the first half of 2026 (EPRC, accessed November 12).
This dependence extends beyond trade, raising serious concerns about Georgia’s food and energy security. The concentration of imports in strategically important sectors leaves the country vulnerable to supply disruptions, price manipulation, and economic leverage used for political purposes.
Alongside Russia’s economic expansion in Georgia and intensifying political and diplomatic contacts at the highest level, the two countries’ religious institutions are also steadily deepening their cooperation, often moving ahead of politicians. On October 14, Russian clergy held a service in Russian at a Georgian Orthodox church in Georgia’s ancient capital. Responding to the public outcry, the Patriarchate of Georgia said such practices were common, as visiting clergy are generally permitted to conduct services in their native language (On.ge, October 16). Even before the incident, the Patriarchate of Georgia had hosted delegations from the Moscow Patriarchate twice in the past two months, on September 30 and October 2 (Facebook/Publika, October 3). On November 20, a delegation from the Georgian Patriarchate is scheduled to visit Russia for jubilee celebrations honoring Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus’ (TV Pirveli, October 28).
These developments point to a gradual deepening of Georgia’s rapprochement with Russia, extending beyond the economic sphere to political, diplomatic, and religious relations. If the current trend continues, Tbilisi’s formal distance from Moscow risks becoming little more than a rhetorical façade, while growing economic and political dependence could significantly undermine Georgia’s foreign policy independence.
https://jamestown.org/georgia-begins-de-facto-diplomatic-reset-with-russia