Fifth Plenum Resolution Shifts Party Discipline Toward Implementation
The Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee Fifth Plenum, whose Resolution was published by Xinhua on November 1, shifts its focus from purges of senior officials toward ensuring that officials at all levels implement the Party Center’s decisions. The document uses “implementation” 43 times, compared with 15 in the 2009 Party-building decision, and places Party spirit and loyalty at the center of official assessments while limiting the authority of local and departmental leaders and making them accountable for major decisions. The article says the approach depends on information supplied by officials themselves and may lead to renewed campaign-style governance, whose effects could fade over time.
The Fifth Plenum’s Resolution downplays the current purge, as it does not use terms such as “political ambition” or “conspiracy,” in contrast to the 2016 Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee. This consolidates the Party’s unity and solidarity, and suggests that Xi no longer sees senior officials as the main threat. The Resolution mainly targets the implementation of the Party Center’s decisions and plans. The word “implementation” (落实) appears 43 times, compared with 15 times in the previous Party-building decision in 2009. Most of the problems it lists arise at the implementation stage, indicating that the center sees officials at all levels responsible for carrying out policy as the root of the problem. To this end, the Resolution puts “strengthening the Party spirit” first in its discussion section and writes Party spirit—essentially loyalty to Xi—into the procedures for examining and appointing officials. It also weakens the personal authority of “top leaders” (一把手) at every level and makes leading officials accountable for major decisions for life. A lack of information constrains strict Party governance. The center still judges officials’ Party spirit or loyalty by what officials themselves, their superiors, and their subordinates report. The stricter the discipline, the more likely this information is to be distorted, and the harder it is to turn disciplinary pressure into effective implementation. Implementation after the plenum is likely to slide back into campaign-style governance, with effects that diminish over time, as in the past.
On November 1, Xinhua published the Resolution from the 20th Central Committee’s Fifth Plenum, which took as its topic “Persevering with Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance” (持之以恒推进全面从严治党), along with an explanation by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping (Xinhua, November 1 [a], [b]). The plenum was the latest devoted to Party building, following those of 1994, 2004, and 2009. [1] In his explanation, Xi sums up the premise of the document: “the key to managing China’s affairs well lies in our Party, especially in exercising full and rigorous self-governance” (办好中国的事情,关键在党,关键在全面从严治党). This echoed the 2009 decision, which stated that the key lies in the Party, though it did not include the additional phrase (People’s Daily, September 27, 2009). It also modified a set of 2016 guidelines that said the key lay “in the Party supervising itself and governing itself strictly” (在党要管党、从严治党) (Xinhua, November 2, 2016). [2]
The Resolution goes a step further by proclaiming that “strict management of officials is the key to full and rigorous governance over the Party” (全面从严治党关键在从严治吏). The sentiment indicates the Party believes that governing effectively requires a bureaucratic corps that is fully politically loyal.
Consolidating Party Unity Is the Plenum’s Starting Point
Xi gives three reasons for strict Party governance, called “essential requirements” (必然要求), in the Explanation. The first is “maintaining the Party’s advanced nature and integrity and consolidating its long-term governing position” (保持党的先进性和纯洁性、巩固党的长期执政地位). Xi believes that for the Party to “escape the historical cycle of rise and fall” (跳出治乱兴衰历史周期率), “self-revolution” (自我革命) is required, and that entails “turning the blade inward” (刀刃向内) while exercising rigorous self-governance. [3] The second is “consolidating and developing” (巩固和发展) a political situation in which “great solidarity and unity are maintained across the whole Party” (全党高度团结统一). This is in effect an attempt to repair the loss of legitimacy resulting from the recent and ongoing purges. The third is “fulfilling the Party’s historic mission” (实现党的历史使命)—strict Party governance is seen as the foundation for building a great country and addressing risks and challenges.
Of these, the second best differentiates this plenum from earlier ones. At the Sixth Plenum in 2016, Xi accused a “tiny number” (极少数人) of senior officials—of whom he named five—of becoming “swollen with political ambition and hungry for power” (政治野心膨胀、权欲熏心), engaging in forming cliques for private gain, building factions, seeking power and position, and other “political conspiracies” (政治阴谋活动) (Xinhua, November 2, 2016). [4] Neither the 2026 Explanation nor the Resolution names any of those disciplined and there is no mention of “ambition” or “conspiracy.” When discussing threats at the top, both documents use the perfect tense, saying that, since the 18th Party Congress, the Party has “removed serious dangers hidden within the Party, the state, and the military” (消除了党、国家、军队内部存在的严重隐患). This line comes from the Party’s third historical resolution in 2021, whose preceding paragraph listed the cases of several of these men (Xinhua, November 16, 2021).
Downplaying the current purge helps consolidate Party unity. The five named in 2016 all held senior positions before Xi took power, whereas the senior officials purged in this round were all promoted by Xi himself. Former Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠), for example, was promoted by Xi in 2017 and kept on in 2022 (Xinhua, October 25, 2017, October 23, 2022). The omission of their names might be intended to avoid highlighting Xi’s poor personnel choices in the Party’s historical record. Another possibility is that Xi does not deign to mention them at all—they are merely his vassals, not rivals. The lack of charges implicating the Party Center also accentuates Xi’s exceptionalism, in which the rules he lays down for the rest of the Party do not appear to apply to the very top.
Criticism of purged individuals has also been toned down to preserve Party solidarity. The Resolution opens by accusing “a small number” (少数) of members and officials, including high-ranking officials, of “weak Party spirit” (党性不强). The identified symptoms are wavering ideals and convictions, “incorrect views of performance” (政绩观出现偏差), a tendency to shirk responsibilities or duties, and, most seriously, “abusing power for personal gain and becoming decadent” (以权谋私、腐化堕落). Interestingly, although an earlier notice charged Zhang Youxia and fellow CMC member Liu Zhenli (刘振立) with “intertwined political and economic problems” (政治问题和经济问题交织), the plenum did not, as in 2016, accuse them of “political ambition” (Xinhua, September 21; China Brief, September 23). Apart from confirming their expulsion from the Party in its communiqué, the plenum mentioned the phrase only in the Resolution’s section on anti-corruption, which lists cases involving both “political and economic issues” as a priority category to be investigated.
The Resolution Targets Poor Implementation of Decisions
Strict Party governance mainly targets problems of execution at lower levels, not the center’s top-level design. Most of the problems the Resolution lists arise after the center has made a decision. [5] At the plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) in January 2026, Xi said that “problems such as failing to implement, or implementing recklessly” (不落实、乱落实等问题) the Party Center’s major decisions and plans still exist, and are “fairly prominent in some areas” (有的方面还比较突出) (Qiushi, October 15). Both kinds of problem go back a long way. In the case of the Qinling villas, Xi issued six written instructions starting in May 2014, but Shaanxi Province and Xi’an City let them “spin idly at every level” (层层空转). [6] The problem was investigated and dealt with only after the center sent a special rectification team in July 2018 (CCTV, January 9, 2019). In 2021, the large-scale relocation and felling of urban trees in Guangzhou was labeled “a typical act of destructive ‘construction’” (典型的破坏性“建设”行为), and ten leading officials were held accountable (CCDI, December 12, 2021). Comparing the two plenums, in 2016 the concern was still that people at the top were forming factions; in 2026, it is whether officials at all levels carry out the center’s decisions.
Changes in wording show the Party’s concerns more clearly (see Table 1). “Implementation” (落实) appears 3, 10, and 15 times in the Party-building decisions of 1994, 2004, and 2009, respectively, and 43 times in this one. “Oversight” (监督) rises from 28 mentions in 2009 to 58. Party committee “top leaders” (一把手) were never referenced in the three earlier documents but, 13 times in this one. The last three documents are of similar length, yet the count for “institutions” (制度) has not risen; the emphasis has shifted from establishing to implementing and overseeing them.
Table 1: Frequency of Terms in Four Plenum Decisions on Party Building
| Term | 1994 | 2004 | 2009 | 2026 |
| Implementat-ion (落实) | 3 | 10 | 15 | 43 |
| Oversight (监督) | 22 | 24 | 28 | 58 |
| Party spirit (党性) | 2 | 1 | 11 | 24 |
| Loyalty (忠诚) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
| “Top leader” (一把手) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| Institutions (制度) | 38 | 48 | 65 | 59 |
| Total Chinese characters | 11,152 | 15,057 | 14,251 | 15,391 |
(Source: Author’s count based on the full texts of the four documents; see note [1].)
The Resolution Uses Party Spirit and Loyalty to Constrain Implementers
The seven parts of the Resolution’s discussion section set out remedies for these problems, most of which are aimed at individuals, with Party regulations last. Strengthening the Party spirit is the most important of these and is defined as “a fundamental task in our efforts to ensure full and rigorous Party self-governance” (全面从严治党的根本性任务).
“Party spirit” (党性) is a concept formed in the Yan’an period. From the outset, it was meant to rein in those who went their own way. In 1939, Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) lectured in Yan’an on How to Be a Good Communist (论共产党员的修养), calling “the interests of the Party above all else” the highest principle for Party members (Marxists Internet Archive, accessed November 15). In 1941, the Politburo adopted a “Decision on Strengthening Party Spirit” (关于增强党性的决定), which targeted the individualism, independentism, and decentralism opposed to centralization that had emerged amid scattered guerrilla warfare (Marxists Internet Archive, accessed November 15). The new resolution gives it more specific content—beyond requiring Party members to prioritize loyalty to the Party, it demands understanding “the decisive significance” of the Two Establishments (深刻领悟“两个确立”的决定性意义) and upholding Xi’s “core” (核心) position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole.
The Resolution also writes Party spirit into personnel procedures. A dedicated item on “enhancing Party spirit appraisal” (加强党性鉴别) makes it an important criterion for evaluating officials, focusing on their mindset, loyalty, and integrity (境界格局和忠诚度廉洁度). Organization departments are to share information with discipline inspection, inspection-tour, audit, and public complaints bodies so as to conduct a “comprehensive analysis and assessment” (综合分析研判) of the Party spirit of leadership team members, candidates for promotion, and young officials, with the results used in selection and appointment.
The section on democratic centralism sets up mechanisms requiring officials to maintain their Party spirit, stay loyal to Xi, and not go their own way. Its core purpose is to uphold the Party Central Committee’s centralized, unified leadership and to ensure Party-wide compliance with its directives. For the heads of localities and departments, the Resolution prescribes a system in which the head is the last to express their opinion and is forbidden to demand that those at subordinate levels uphold their personal authority, and calls for improving “the lifelong accountability system for major decisions made by leading officials” (领导干部重大决策终身负责制). Before the plenum, in January, the General Office of the Central Committee had already issued measures requiring higher-level Party organizations to hold oversight talks with the top leaders of lower-level organizations on how they fulfill their duties as first responsible persons for full and rigorous Party self-governance and how strictly they discipline themselves (Xinhua, February 12). These rules aim to prevent the heads of localities and departments from becoming relatively independent centers of authority. The whole Party can have only one core.
The Resolution extends its demand for loyalty beyond Party organs. The title of its fifth section calls for building “a well-knit organizational system characterized by cross-level alignment and effective implementation” (建设上下贯通、执行有力的严密组织体系). Party committees in state-owned enterprises and state-owned financial enterprises are to review major operational and management matters through ex-ante study and discussion, and Party building is to be strengthened in platform companies and innovative high-tech firms. Oversight by people’s congresses, the judiciary, auditors, public opinion, and others is to be “deeply integrated” (深度融合) with intra-Party oversight and “work efficiently with it” (高效联动). In other words, corporate decision-making and every form of oversight outside the Party must also defer to the will of the Party Center.
That Party regulations come last suggests the center sees little need for new rules. As of July 2021, 3,615 Party regulations were in force (People’s Daily, August 4, 2021). As early as 2019, an official in charge at the General Office of the CCP Central Committee acknowledged that enforcement of the regulations was “hot at the top, lukewarm in the middle, and cold at the bottom” (上热中温下冷) (Xinhua, September 15, 2019). The Resolution therefore names only three regulations to draft or revise, focusing instead on strengthening enforcement and “eliminating hidden rules” (破除潜规则). It demands curbing malpractices such as “cultivating connections or currying favor with higher-ups, placing connections above principles, and acting at the behest of informal notes instead of statutory rules” (“搭天线拜码头”、“原则不如关系”、“章子不如条子”), among others. Of the three, the revised regulations for local Party committees, issued on November 7, mainly add the Resolution’s demands on implementation, such as lifelong accountability for major decision-making errors and a ban on carrying out central decisions “selectively” (做选择) (Xinhua, November 15).
Lack of Information Constrains Strict Party Governance
The blind spot with a top-down approach to governing the Party is that the center cannot directly observe officials’ day-to-day conduct. The center is the principal and officials at all levels are its agents, and information on the ground is held by the agents. Discipline can punish deviations that are detected, but it cannot give the center more information, and Party spirit is harder to observe than performance. Under the Resolution, assessing an official’s Party spirit relies on canvassing superiors, peers, and even ordinary people. The Resolution also acknowledges that what officials profess and how they act often diverge. Its “seven types of misconduct” (七个有之) include “doing one’s own thing while feigning compliance” (搞自行其是、阳奉阴违) and it calls for efforts to “accurately identify and resolutely remove two-faced people” (准确识别、坚决清除两面人). The more weight selection places on Party spirit, the greater officials’ incentives are to put effort into displaying it.
Available data do not yet show that disciplinary pressure has improved implementation. The number of people disciplined nationwide rose from 610,000 in 2023 to 983,000 in 2025, but the share of problems related to inaction has barely changed (CCDI, January 25, 2024; Xinhua, January 17). The CCDI publishes monthly figures on cases of formalism and bureaucratism it has investigated. Problems in the category of “not taking responsibility, not acting, acting recklessly, and acting falsely” (不担当、不作为、乱作为、假作为) numbered around 119,000 in 2025, or 85 percent of the total (CCDI, January 28). [7] This share barely shifted across data from July, August, and September 2026 (CCDI, August 27, September 22, October 27). The channels the center uses to check implementation also pass through the same officials. In July, the CCDI reported that some counties, cities, and districts in Zhangzhou and Nanping, Fujian, had interfered in statistical work by dictating figures and filling in reports on others’ behalf. After the National Bureau of Statistics informed local authorities that statistics had been falsified, the two cities still rated three of these localities “excellent” in their 2025 evaluations (Xinhua, July 15). This shows that even the evaluations meant to push implementation can be gamed. [8]
The Resolution’s call to “deepen the rectification of the problem of [officials] failing to fulfill their duties or acting arbitrarily” (深化不作为、乱作为问题整治) shows that the center is aware that officials are passively going through the motions. Its remedy, however, is to add another layer of discipline. Judging by past experience, the center will likely roll out campaign-style governance (运动式治理) nationwide to make this discipline stick. [9] The first step, lectures and study sessions on the spirit of the plenum in every region and sector, is already underway (Xinhua, November 3). The next step is likely to involve setting targets and evaluating how each locality implements the plenum’s decisions, with localities and departments singling out typical cases, holding up models, and competing on numbers. But the information asymmetry between the center and the localities has not changed, and the grassroots can always find ways around it. As with past campaigns, any marginal effects will likely diminish rapidly until the campaign fizzles out.
Conclusion
The Fifth Plenum Resolution identifies the lack of political loyalty among the bureaucracy as one of the factors holding back the PRC’s development and the CCP’s effective governance of the nation. The country’s affairs depend on the Party, so when things go wrong, the cause must be sought in its officials. The dangers at the top have been removed, so the remaining problem is that officials at all levels fail to implement. The institutions are largely sufficient, so it is the people who carry them out who must be remade. The cost of this approach is that the more the center stresses Party spirit and loyalty, the more it must rely on information that it is unable to fully verify. The likely result is a corps of officials that is more obedient and better at putting on a show, but not necessarily one that is better at getting things done.
Notes
[1] The four documents compared here are the Decision on Several Major Issues concerning Strengthening Party Building (关于加强党的建设几个重大问题的决定), adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee (September 28, 1994); the Decision on Strengthening the Party’s Governing Capacity (关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定), adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee (September 19, 2004); the Decision on Several Major Issues concerning Strengthening and Improving Party Building under New Circumstances (关于加强和改进新形势下党的建设若干重大问题的决定), adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee (September 18, 2009); and the current Resolution. The Sixth Plenums of the 13th Central Committee (1990) and the 15th Central Committee (2001) also adopted decisions on Party building, but these dealt only with single aspects of it, namely the Party’s ties with the people and the Party’s conduct, and are not included in the comparison. All four documents are called “decisions” (决定) in Chinese, but the official English translation of this one is “Resolution.” In official translations, “Resolution” used to refer only to documents called “决议”; since the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee in 2024, it has also been used for “决定.” According to Xi’s Explanation, the Resolution has three sections: Part I gives an overview; Parts II through VIII form the discussion section, with 33 items; and the final section covers the oversight system and political responsibility.
[2] The full title of the 2016 guidelines is “The Norms of Political Life within the Party under New Circumstances” (关于新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则).
[3] The literal meaning of “自我革命” is “self-revolution.” Xinhua’s official English translations of the Resolution and the Explanation render it as “self-reform” (Xinhua, November 1 [a], [b]). Elsewhere, the same translations render “革命” as “revolution,” as in “new-democratic revolution” (新民主主义革命) and “revolutionary tempering” (革命性锻造), which shows that the choice was deliberate. “刀刃向内” (turning the blade inward), part of Xi’s definition, is rendered as “with unflinching courage.” Apart from clearly deliberate distortions like these, this article uses the official wording when quoting official documents.
[4] The five were Zhou Yongkang (周永康), Bo Xilai (薄熙来), Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄), Xu Caihou (徐才厚), and Ling Jihua (令计划).
[5] Some of the problems identified includecalls for promptly identifying and addressing “any ineffective or distorted implementation” of the Central Committee’s major decisions and plans, opposing “discussion with no decisions, decisions with no action, and action with no results” in leadership teams, and demands rectifying “instances of ignoring orders and prohibitions” to “prevent our institutions from running null and void.”
[6] The villas were built in the northern foothills of the Qinling Mountains outside Xi’an, an ecological barrier that divides northern and southern China. Official accounts describe them as illegal and environmentally destructive; 1,194 villas were eventually targeted for investigation and rectification (CCTV, January 9, 2019).
[7] The wording in the CCDI’s monthly reports is: “not taking responsibility, not acting, acting recklessly, and acting falsely in performing duties, serving economic and social development, and protecting the ecological environment, seriously affecting high-quality development” (在履职尽责、服务经济社会发展和生态环境保护方面不担当、不作为、乱作为、假作为,严重影响高质量发展). The denominator of the share is the total number of formalism and bureaucratism problems investigated in the same period.
[8] Research on the previous round of anti-corruption reached a similar conclusion. Drawing on 40 interviews and 98 days of fieldwork, Peng Wang and Xia Yan found that the anti-corruption campaign led local officials, whose first concern became avoiding risk and keeping their posts, to stop actively mobilizing resources to promote local development; slacking became their new way of coping. See Peng Wang and Xia Yan, “Bureaucratic Slack in China: The Anti-corruption Campaign and the Decline of Patronage Networks in Developing Local Economies,” The China Quarterly 243 (2020): 611–634, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/bureaucratic-slack-in-china-the-anticorruption-campaign-and-the-decline-of-patronage-networks-in-developing-local-economies/8CBF5E3B2DEF19012ED980C2F62FDDFE.[9] Zhou Xueguang (周雪光) characterizes campaign-style governance as follows: “The defining feature of campaign-style governance is that it (temporarily) interrupts and halts the routine operation of the bureaucracy, in which everyone keeps to their post and follows set procedures. It aims to replace, break through, or rectify the existing bureaucracy and its routine mechanisms, substituting top-down political mobilization to marshal resources and concentrate the efforts and attention of all parties on accomplishing a particular task.” See Zhou Xueguang, “运动型治理机制:中国国家治理的制度逻辑再思考” [The Campaign-Style Governance Mechanism: Rethinking the Institutional Logic of State Governance in China], Open Times (开放时代), no. 9 (2012): 106, https://web.stanford.edu/~xgzhou/zhou_12_campaign_CH.pdf
https://jamestown.org/fifth-plenum-resolution-shifts-party-discipline-toward-implementation