Life Under Russian Occupation

This article is based on six interviews: two with senior representatives from Ukrainian non-governmental organizations that assist with evacuations from Russian-occupied territories, whose work involves direct contact with and support for evacuees; one with a senior representative of a humanitarian initiative working to locate, return, reintegrate, and support Ukrainian children affected by occupation; one with the head of a Ukrainian company that regularly conducts qualitative and quantitative research in the occupied territories; and two with international experts working on Russian occupation policy, human rights, and humanitarian issues. Any opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the official stance of The Jamestown Foundation.

Executive Summary:

• Russia is transforming its occupation of Ukraine into a comprehensive system of long-term control to integrate occupied territories, suppress Ukrainian identity, and compel civilian compliance. 
• Russian occupation authorities have made leaving occupied territories difficult, especially for families with children and men of mobilization age. High evacuation costs and administrative obstacles trap many civilians under occupation. 
• Economic decline, property seizures, and deteriorating public services are deepening dependence on occupation authorities. Businesses have closed, homes risk confiscation without Russian registration, and shortages of essential services are worsening daily life. 
• Moscow uses schools, child protection mechanisms, and passport regulations to coerce families into compliance, threatening parents with child removal while expanding educational and administrative measures designed to Russify children and eliminate Ukrainian identity. 
• Russian authorities are tightening information controls and expanding surveillance by restricting access to Ukrainian media, increasing internet monitoring, and conducting frequent phone inspections, fostering distrust and fear of denunciation among residents. 

Introduction

Conditions in occupied Ukraine have substantially deteriorated since 2022. Russia has gradually transformed military occupation into a comprehensive system of governance designed to permanently integrate occupied territories into the Russian state, erase Ukrainian identity, and suppress any form of resistance. For approximately five million Ukrainians living under Russian occupation, daily life is a constant struggle for survival (Slovo I Dilo, July 10). Residents face routine document checks, surveillance, phone inspections, filtration (фильтрация, fil’tratsiia) procedures, and the constant risk of detention for perceived disloyalty (see EDM, February 19, July 30). [1][1]Filtration is Russia’s compulsory security screening system imposed in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Filtration subjects Ukrainian civilians to biometric data...

Occupation Authorities Make Leaving Difficult

Leaving the occupied territories of Ukraine is difficult even for those holding Russian passports (Radio Svoboda, June 7). Despite claiming that the occupied territories are now part of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin maintains border checks it established following the occupation (Center of National Resistance, April 11). Civilians seeking to reach Kyiv-controlled Ukraine, third countries, or even mainland Russia must go via checkpoints and often face hours of Federal Security Service (FSB) questioning and checks of their personal belongings, including their phones.

Those who manage to leave the occupied territories face difficulties and financial constraints in reaching Ukraine. It takes time and money to go through Russia, then Belarus, to the only remaining humanitarian corridor to Ukraine. Many must also contact and visit the Ukrainian Embassy in Minsk to get the necessary documents. Those with Russian passports also face issues when traveling to third countries. Even if Ukrainians can reach Belarus or another route, they may need to wait in Minsk or elsewhere while their documents are processed.

Some Ukrainian civilians attempting to travel through Russia on their way to Kyiv-controlled Ukraine have been subjected to filtration and subsequently banned from entering Russia. Russian occupation authorities perceive the absence of Russian passports as disloyalty, complicating the process of leaving occupied territories. Leaving through Russia is the only viable way to exit the occupied territories for most civilians, but the occupation authorities continue to impose restrictions and prevent some groups of people from leaving.

Leaving is especially difficult for people without up-to-date Ukrainian documents, people identified as suspicious or pro-Ukrainian, and young people who never received Ukrainian passports. Some people may be unable to leave because the FSB has effectively flagged them as “suspicious.” This has happened on some occasions at filtration points, particularly between the occupied city of Donetsk and Russia’s Rostov-on-Don.

The costs of evacuation also present a challenge for many Ukrainians who decide to leave the occupied territories. Evacuation can cost hundreds or even thousands of dollars in difficult cases involving people with limited mobility or disabilities. Kremlin-funded media discourages Ukrainians from attempting to leave the occupied territories by claiming that nobody is waiting for them in government-controlled Ukraine and that they will be viewed as collaborators.

Families with children face additional administrative obstacles. Children born or raised under occupation may lack valid Ukrainian documents, and obtaining Russian documents can attract the attention of occupation authorities if officials suspect that the family intends to leave. Parents report that the absence of Russian documents is treated as a sign of disloyalty. At the same time, some families face repeated bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to obtain documents required for travel.

It has become particularly difficult for mobilization-age men to leave the occupied territories. They face increasing searches and interrogations on administrative borders with Russia (see EDM, June 1). Some younger men have been refused passage at checkpoints, detained, turned back, and subsequently prohibited from leaving. Occupation officials have often justified such measures by claiming that the men intended to leave the occupied territories to join Ukrainian forces.

Ukrainians Face Economic Pressure and Property Seizure in Occupied Territories

According to Ukrinform, approximately 90 percent of industrial enterprises in the occupied territories have reportedly been closed or repurposed as of December 2025. Many of those still operating have been integrated into Russia’s military-industrial complex (Ukrinform, December 16, 2025). In the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, only five or six of the 96 mines operating before occupation reportedly remain active.

This shift has led to a decline in jobs and lower salaries for Ukrainians, as well as the expansion of “grey” economy practices when people, especially men of mobilization age, work without documents to avoid potential conscription, especially in frontline regions. Many people are forced to look for temporary jobs or unofficial employment to meet basic needs, with Russian companies taking over small- to medium-sized Ukrainian enterprises. As a result, life is a daily struggle for survival for many Ukrainians living in the occupied territories.

Ukrainians are increasingly reliant on pensions and other payments from the Russian occupation authorities to meet their basic needs. Access to these resources increasingly depends on holding Russian documents and being perceived as loyal to the occupation system.

The worsening economic situation has led people to view access to work and resources as uneven. Social tension is leading to distrust and social withdrawal. Residents often mention negative emotions, burnout, and loss of hope, which result in no future planning and the effect of “frozen time.” By contrast, Ukrainians perceived as loyal to the Russian occupation authorities have easier access to resources, work, and business opportunities. Russians brought into occupied Ukraine are reportedly paid as much as two or three times more than the local population.

Housing insecurity has also become widespread in occupied territories. In April, Moscow issued a decree requiring property registered under Ukrainian law to be re-registered under Russian law (see EDM, May 5). This legal change enables Russia to pressure Ukrainians into accepting Russian citizenship or seize their property, as re-registration can only be done in person and requires a Russian passport. In this regard, Russian authorities have reportedly identified around 550,000 properties that are absent from the Russian registry and could therefore be designated “ownerless” (Suspilne, June 6).

There have been numerous instances in which Ukrainians were unable to return to re-register their properties in compliance with Russian laws. They later discovered that other people were already living in their homes. Returning to protect a property is dangerous and expensive, requiring travel through Russia and exposure to filtration, interrogation, possible detention, or a long-term entry ban. Even those who reach the occupied territories may be unable to complete re-registration without a Russian passport. The threat of dispossession functions as another instrument of Russian passportization, exerting pressure on Ukrainians to return and accept Russian documents simply to retain their homes.

Basic Services Under Pressure in Occupied Territories

Since early this year, Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics have affected the occupation authorities’ ability to provide basic services. One of the most visible consequences has been recurring fuel shortages, disrupting public utilities, agriculture, and transport across the occupied territories (Suspilne, June 29; Apostrof, July 21). The lack of fuel has delayed this year’s harvest by weeks, while shortages have increasingly disrupted municipal services and everyday civilian life (Khersononline, July 21). The same disruptions have contributed to growing anxiety among occupation officials and police, who increasingly perceive themselves as potential targets.

Critical infrastructure and access to basic services have been deteriorating in the occupied territories since 2022. Russian occupation authorities have largely neglected the development and maintenance of critical infrastructure, with numerous challenges reported across the healthcare, energy, food, and water sectors (see EDM, May 5). In many localities across occupied territories in all four oblasts, there are persistent issues with water, electricity, gas, medicines, postal service, and even emergency services (RN.news, July 8; Most, July 17; Prikhist, July 20).

Even where basic services remain formally available, accessing them has become increasingly difficult. Ukrainians often must travel to larger towns to obtain medicine or consult specialist doctors. Elderly people, people with disabilities, and residents of smaller or frontline communities face especially serious difficulties, as they are less able to travel.

‘Child Protection’ as a Way to Coerce Family Compliance

Moscow uses education and child protection mechanisms to force compliance from families in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Russian occupation authorities threaten to take children away from parents and temporarily place them in specialized boarding institutions if parents refuse to enroll their children in Russian schools or if they are caught engaging in remote education activities in Ukrainian. Occupation authorities may then assess whether parents are willing to cooperate. If they continue to resist, children can remain in institutions or potentially be transferred to other families inside Russia or the occupied territories.

Occupation authority-administered schools serve as one of the primary channels through which occupation authorities promote official narratives about the war, Russia, Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the West. Weekly patriotic activities, compulsory ceremonies, revised history textbooks, and regular meetings with Russian servicemen normalize the occupation and leave little space for alternative interpretations of current events.

Once enrolled in Russian schools, children face an education system designed to eliminate Ukrainian identity and normalize the occupation (see EDM, July 13, 15). This takes the form of Russian flag-raising, Russian anthem singing, letters to veterans, and a curriculum that promotes negative narratives about Ukraine, the United States, and the West (see EDM, July 15). Punitive measures are taken against children who refuse to sing the Russian anthem or decline to pledge allegiance to Russia, with reports of children being taken out of class and even beaten in basements. Attempts to Russify children in the occupied territories of Ukraine extend into extracurricular activities, military-patriotic camps, and youth organizations that introduce children to weapons, drones, tactical medicine, and military discipline.

Russian occupation authorities are also exerting administrative pressure on children and their families to obtain Russian passports. Earlier, children under the age of 14 could leave with legal guardians or parents from occupied territories. On January 20, however, Russia introduced new exit and entry regulations removing birth certificates from the list of valid travel documents for children under the age of 14 in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2025; FSB Border Service, accessed January 22). As a result, minors in territories under the Kremlin’s control, including Crimea and other occupied parts of Ukraine, can legally cross borders only if they hold a Russian passport. This new rule eliminates the last non-passport exit option for Ukrainian children living under Russian occupation (see EDM, January 22). Some parents who have sought passports for their children under the age of 14 have faced questioning from migration officials and the FSB over why they are applying for documents, as it creates suspicion of potential plans to leave the occupied territories.

Information Space Narrowing in the Occupied Territories

It is becoming increasingly difficult for Ukrainians living under occupation to access information from the outside world, particularly from Kyiv-controlled Ukraine. Earlier this year, the Kremlin worked to block Telegram and WhatsApp in the occupied territories (Zmina, April 3). These efforts have achieved only partial success, however, and intermittent access to these applications remains possible in some locations.

The Kremlin is working toward a tightly managed information environment in which pro-Russian propaganda determines how reality is interpreted. Many Ukrainians report losing trust in information due to the discrepancies between Russian news and their daily struggle to survive under the occupation.

Russian occupation authorities are also working to introduce a mechanism for compulsory identification of internet users via a Russian state portal, State Services (Госуслуги, Gosuslugi), to restrict access to Ukrainian and foreign online resources via a virtual private network (VPN) (Suspilne, July 13). The Ministry of Digital Development of the Russian Federation is launching a mechanism that would require users to verify their identities through Gosuslugi and link a dedicated internet protocol (IP) address to their confirmed profile (Suspilne, July 13). The Kremlin intends to make it impossible for Ukrainians in the occupied territories to access foreign and Ukrainian online resources and freely receive information beyond Russian propaganda.

Ukrainians are still managing to exchange news using messengers, making personal communication an important source of information. It has become increasingly difficult to use VPN and messengers this year, however, due to the above measures introduced by Russian occupation authorities. Residents must make a concerted effort to access Ukrainian sources of information. Some people are trying to use unpopular messengers, like those from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to at least maintain communication with the outside world. Others use Russian mail providers to communicate, or if they cannot call on Telegram, they send voice messages or text there.

Ukrainians Living Under Surveillance in Occupied Territories

Residents of the occupied territories report that they avoid talking politics even among family members. For instance, parents often avoid discussing politics with their children. They fear that comments repeated at school or during extracurricular activities could attract the attention of occupation authorities. As a result, many children grow up learning that expressing alternative views might be risky and carry consequences for their family members. Digital behavior has also become more cautious due to the fear of checks from occupation authorities, leading to a lack of trust in the digital space and self-censorship.

There are cases of residents of the occupied territories denouncing other Ukrainians, creating a sense of distrust among residents. At bus stops, in shops, and in other public places, residents avoid discussing anything significant because they fear that someone may report them and that they could subsequently be detained. As Russia creates economic desperation, people become more willing to report neighbors or colleagues because of potential financial rewards from occupation authorities.

Russian occupation authorities have increased home raids and phone inspections in public places this year. Having Signal on a phone can be viewed with suspicion. Ukrainian apps, Ukrainian media, pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels, or even having certain contacts can reportedly lead to detention, beating, or disappearance. Ukrainians planning to enter or leave the occupied territories often delete browsing histories, messages, and other potentially incriminating material or begin using a second phone well in advance, keeping it deliberately “clean” of Ukrainian media, political discussions, suspicious contacts, and applications that could attract attention at a checkpoint.

Conclusion

The Kremlin is transforming occupation into a comprehensive system of control over nearly every aspect of civilian life. For Ukrainians living under Russian rule, everyday life has become a struggle for survival amid economic deterioration, expanding surveillance, and administrative coercion. Moscow’s success does not depend on making people genuinely loyal. Instead, it seeks to make them obedient through exhaustion, fear, and the loss of hope that Ukrainian rule will return. It aims to create conditions in which compliance appears to be the only viable means of survival, thereby consolidating its long-term control over the occupied territories.

Notes:

[1] [1] Filtration is Russia’s compulsory security screening system imposed in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Filtration subjects Ukrainian civilians to biometric data... Filtration is Russia’s compulsory security screening system imposed in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Filtration subjects Ukrainian civilians to biometric data collection, interrogation, body searches, inspections of phones and personal belongings, and, in many cases, violence and arbitrary detention.

https://jamestown.org/life-under-russian-occupation