UK statement to the 10th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), April 2026
UK states grave concern about nuclear safety risks arising from Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine and its continued presence at Zaporizhzhia NPP, which prevents Ukraine from exercising regulatory control under the CNS. It rejects Russia's claims of ZNPP transfer to Russian jurisdiction and any reporting by a State that does not own or regulate the installation, in line with IAEA's position that ZNPP is Ukrainian and urging the Review Meeting to reject such reporting. Russia's actions demonstrate a blatant disregard for the CNS, undermine its first objective of achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety, and interfere with independent regulatory oversight and license-holder responsibilities under Articles 8 and 9; the UK commends Ukraine and fully supports the IAEA's work with Ukraine to reduce risk and maintain safety, praising IAEA staff.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety is the key international legally binding instrument for nuclear safety that currently has 98 Contracting Parties.
President,
The United Kingdom remains gravely concerned about the nuclear safety risks arising from the Russian Federation’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, including its continued presence at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). This situation is preventing Ukraine’s competent authorities from exercising effective regulatory control and from fully discharging their responsibilities as a Contracting Party under the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
We reject the Russian Federation’s claims that the ZNPP has been transferred to Russian Federation jurisdiction, and its attempt to report on the facility under the Convention. We fully align with the consistent position of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that ZNPP is a Ukrainian nuclear installation.
Under Article 4 of the Convention only Ukraine is entitled to report on the safety of ZNPP. Any reporting by a State that neither lawfully owns nor regulates a nuclear installation is not credible and risks undermining the integrity of the entire peer review process. We therefore look to this Review Meeting, under your leadership, to reject such reporting and to uphold the principles on which the Convention is based.
The Russian Federation’s actions have demonstrated a blatant disregard for the objectives and obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, exposing nuclear installations to risks they are neither designed nor licensed to endure and directly undermine the Convention’s core aim of preventing accidents and mitigating their radiological consequences. Interference with independent regulatory oversight and with the responsibilities of the license holder, including through the presence of unauthorised personnel at ZNPP, prevent the legally responsible Ukrainian organisations from meeting their obligations under Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention and are fundamentally incompatible with its first objective of achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety.
We commend Ukraine for its continued commitment to participate in this Review Meeting and to meet its obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety in exceptionally difficult circumstances.
Finally, we express our full support for the IAEA’s work with Ukraine to help reduce the risk of a nuclear accident and to maintain nuclear safety under unprecedented conditions. We pay tribute to IAEA staff who continue to operate with professionalism and dedication in the most challenging circumstances.
