Janez Janša na Blejskem strateškem forumu: Evropa mora svojo prihodnost oblikovati sama

31.8.2026 - | gov.si

Predsednik vlade Janez Janša je na Blejskem strateškem forumu poudaril, da bo sposobnost Evrope, da tudi v prihodnje oblikuje svet okoli sebe, odvisna predvsem od štirih strateških dejavnikov: varnosti, odpornosti, demografske vitalnosti in verodostojnosti. »Moč za oblikovanje prihodnosti se gradi postopoma. Toda trenutki, ki jo določijo, pogosto pridejo nenadoma,« je dejal.

Premier je ob tem spomnil na slovensko osamosvojitev in 25. oktober 1991, ko je Slovenijo zapustil zadnji vojak Jugoslovanske ljudske armade. Le 18 mesecev prej je bila Slovenija razorožena in soočena z neprimerno močnejšo vojaško strukturo. Slovenska izkušnja po njegovih besedah dokazuje, da velikost države ne določa nujno njene usode in da je tudi za majhne države sposobnost oblikovanja lastne prihodnosti odvisna od pravočasnih odločitev, zavezništev in verodostojnosti.

Na področju varnosti je predsednik vlade poudaril, da mir ni samoumeven in da Nato ostaja nepogrešljiv. Močnejša Evropa po njegovih besedah ni alternativa čezatlantskemu partnerstvu, temveč pogoj za njegovo dolgoročno vzdržnost. Ob tem je izpostavil podporo Ukrajini, ki ne brani zgolj svojega ozemlja, ampak tudi načelo, da meja ni mogoče spreminjati s silo in da imajo narodi pravico sami izbrati svojo prihodnost. »Če bo agresija nagrajena, bo ta lekcija razumljena daleč onkraj Ukrajine,« je opozoril in dodal: »Načela brez zmogljivosti ne odvračajo.«

Kot pomemben strateški izziv je izpostavil tudi zmanjševanje nevarnih odvisnosti. Izkušnja z rusko energijo je po njegovih besedah pokazala, kako hitro se lahko gospodarska odvisnost spremeni v geopolitično ranljivost. Enako velja za kritične surovine, polprevodnike, tehnologije in strateške dobavne verige. »Učinkovitost brez odpornosti lahko ustvarja odvisnost, odvisnost pa se lahko spremeni v vzvod pritiska.« Evropa mora zato krepiti lastne zmogljivosti in biti sposobna inovirati, ne pa zgolj regulirati tehnologij, razvitih drugje.

Predsednik vlade je posebej opozoril tudi na demografske izzive. »Demografija je strategija,« je poudaril. Pri tem ne gre zgolj za številke, temveč za vprašanje, ali mladi zaupajo v prihodnost, si lahko zagotovijo dom, ustvarijo kariero in družino. Ob tem je poudaril, da nezakonite migracije niso odgovor na demografski upad. Evropa potrebuje varne meje ter zakonite in selektivne migracije, ki odgovarjajo na dejanske gospodarske potrebe.

Posebno pozornost je premier namenil verodostojnosti Slovenije in Evropske unije. »Za majhno državo je verodostojnost sama po sebi vir moči. Svoj vpliv povečujemo tako, da gradimo zavezništva, smo zanesljivi partnerji in držimo besedo.« Slovenija mora zato po njegovih besedah izpolnjevati svoje obveznosti do zaveznikov, tudi na področju vlaganj v lastno in kolektivno obrambo, verodostojnost pa mora zagotavljati tako navzven kot doma.

V tem okviru je predsednik vlade izpostavil tudi pomen širitve Evropske unije. »Celovita in svobodna Evropa ne more imeti stalne čakalnice na Zahodnem Balkanu. Prav tako ne more sprejeti, da bi o prihodnosti Ukrajine odločal kdor koli drug kot ukrajinsko ljudstvo.« Širitev po njegovih besedah ni usluga državam kandidatkam, ampak strateška odločitev o prihodnji podobi Evrope. »Če se EU ne bo širila, se bo nekdo drug – na naš račun.«

Predsednik vlade je sklenil, da bo od odgovorov na štiri strateške izzive odvisno, ali bo Evropa zgolj objekt geopolitičnih sprememb ali njihov dejavni sooblikovalec. »Majhna država lahko spozna, da njena velikost ne določa njene usode, tako kot lahko celina spozna, da zaton ne določa njene prihodnosti. To je moč oblikovanja prihodnosti. Ne iluzija, da lahko nadzorujemo zgodovino, temveč volja, da jo oblikujemo.«

V nadaljevanju objavljamo celoten govor predsednika vlade v angleškem jeziku:

»Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

In Ernest Hemingway's novel The Sun Also Rises, Bill asks Mike how he went bankrupt. Mike answers: “Two ways. Gradually and then suddenly.”

It is a line about money, but also a good description of international history. Deterrence erodes gradually, then suddenly war returns. Dependencies build up gradually, and then, suddenly, one side turns them into leverage—by shutting off a critical supply or withholding a shipment. Technologies mature gradually, then suddenly they change the balance of power.

But the same can be true of freedom.

On 25 October 1991, I remember flying in a helicopter above the motorway towards Postojna. Below us was the last column of the Yugoslav army withdrawing towards Koper. Only 18 months earlier, Slovenia had been disarmed and threatened by a military structure vastly stronger than our own. Yet that day we watched the last defeated aggressor’s soldiers leave Slovenian territory.

It looked sudden. But the roots of that change went back years.

That is why the theme of this year's Bled Strategic Forum, The Power to Shape the Future, is important. The power to shape the future is built gradually. But the moments that determine it often come suddenly.

The economic historian Eric Jones asked why Europe, rather than larger and more centralized empires, produced so many breakthroughs that transformed the modern world. Part of his answer was Europe's political plurality: many states, close enough to learn from one another, independent enough to compete.

We are often told that power limits our choices. It does. But Europe's history shows that fragmentation can also generate competition, adaptation and innovation. Europe's strength was never uniformity. It was the ability to turn its diversity into creativity and ultimately into power.

The question today is whether Europe can do so again. Four strategic tests will determine whether Europe retains the capacity to shape the world around it, or gradually loses that capacity and suddenly discovers that others are shaping its future.

First, security.

Peace is not the natural state of international affairs. It has to be protected. NATO remains indispensable. A stronger Europe is not an alternative to the transatlantic partnership. It is what makes that partnership sustainable. Ukraine reminds us what is at stake. Ukrainians are defending not only their territory, but the principle that borders cannot be changed by force and that nations have the right to choose their own future. A just peace must preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and its European future. If aggression is rewarded, the lesson will be learned far beyond Ukraine. But principles without capabilities do not deter. Investment in European defence-tech start-ups in

2021–2024 was more than 5 times higher than in the preceding three years. Yet over roughly the same period, US investment was still about 2.4 times larger. Europe is moving, but not yet fast enough.

Second, resilience.

Europe learned one of its clearest strategic lessons from Russia. For years, we treated cheap Russian energy as an economic advantage and underestimated the strategic risk. In 2021, Russia supplied 45% of EU gas imports. When Moscow weaponized energy after its invasion of Ukraine, a commercial dependency became a geopolitical vulnerability. By 2025, Russia's share had fallen to 12%. But the lesson goes far beyond energy: efficiency without resilience can create dependence, and dependence can be turned into leverage. The same logic applies elsewhere. The EU still depends on China of its heavy rare-earth supply. Semiconductors, critical minerals and strategic supply chains are all geopolitical terrain. The answer is not autarky. It is diversification, reliable partnerships, domestic capacity in critical sectors and the ability to innovate rather than merely regulate technologies developed elsewhere.

Third, and most important, people.

Demography is strategy. According to Eurostat, the EU's fertility rate has fallen far below replacement level, to 1.34 births per woman in 2024, the lowest ever recorded. Over the past two decades, the share of Europeans over 65 has risen from 16.4% to 21.6%, while the share of children under 15 has fallen. This means fewer workers supporting more dependents, greater pressure on public finances and ultimately fewer people from whom we can draw our scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs and soldiers. But demography is not simply about numbers. It reflects whether young people have confidence in the future: whether they can afford homes, build careers, form relationships and raise families. We should also ask how an increasingly digital way of life is changing the way young people meet, form relationships and build communities. Also important is the awareness that illegal migration is not a demographic policy. It does not solve Europe's demographic decline and, when uncontrolled, creates additional challenges for security, integration and social cohesion. Europe needs secure borders alongside legal, selective migration that responds to real economic needs. Europe therefore has to do several things at once: make it easier for young people to form families, retain and attract talent, bring more people into productive employment, and use education, innovation and technology to raise productivity.

Fourth, credibility.

For a small state, credibility is itself a source of power. We multiply our influence by building alliances, being reliable partners and keeping our word. The same is true of Europe. Our commitments must be credible to our allies, to our adversaries and to those who want to join us. Five years ago, here at BSF, I spoke about the strategic goal of a Europe whole and free, and about a European Union enlarged with the Western Balkans and our Eastern neighbourhood. That goal is more urgent today, not less. A Europe whole and free cannot have a permanent waiting room in the Western Balkans. Nor can it accept that Ukraine’s future should be decided by anyone but the Ukrainian people. Enlargement is not a Favor to candidate countries. It is a strategic decision about the future shape of Europe. Conditions must be met. But credibility works both ways. Europe must also keep its word. As I said many times: if the EU does not enlarge, someone else will – at our expense.

As already said, for a small state, credibility is itself a source of power. And credibility works internally and externally. When it comes to alliances, both a fair sharing of financial burdens and a coordinated attitude to danger are important. Truth be told, we Slovenians still have a little problem

with both. The share of our GDP that we allocate to our own and collective defence is far from what is necessary and from the share it has been promised years ago.

We still owe it to our allies, as well as to our own public, especially to our own public, to answer the question of how it was possible that 2 billion dollars of money from Iran's state-owned Exim Bank was laundered in the largest Slovenian state-owned bank at a time when Iran was under three international sanctions. It was an enormous violation of international law and, of course, domestic law. For more than a year, this money was distributed to more than 75,000 accounts through which the Iranian agency and terrorist network in the Western Hemisphere was paid. A parliamentary inquiry fully revealed the criminal operation. Both, the persons who directly enabled the crime and those who covered it up - despite more than 400 interventions from abroad - were discovered. More than 8 years have passed since the disclosure and handing over of the entire documentation to the prosecutor's office, but to this day, no one has been convicted of by far the largest violation of international and domestic law in recent decades. No one was even charged. The prosecutor's office threw the whole case away or swept it under the carpet under various pretexts. According to experts' estimates, the commissions for the laundered Iranian money amounted to 300 to 500 million dollars. There is a more than reasonable suspicion that part of this money is still used for pro-Iranian propaganda in some Slovenian and European non-governmental and media circles.

Slovenia thus still has a lot of work to do in ensuring both external and internal credibility, and it is right that we acknowledge this when listing what we expect from others.

Together, these four tests – security, resilience, demographic vitality and credibility – come down to one question: can Europe turn its resources, its diversity and its alliances into the power to shape events, or will it adapt to decisions made elsewhere?

Will we build deterrence before aggression reaches us? Will we reduce dangerous dependencies and master the technologies on which our prosperity and security increasingly depend? Will we confront demographic decline while we still have the people, resources and time to do so? And will we strengthen our alliances and complete a Europe whole and free while the opportunity is still ours?

How we answer these four tests will determine whether Europe remains an object of geopolitical change or becomes an author of it. The capacity to shape change is built gradually, year after year, through capabilities, alliances and institutions. But the moment to use this power comes suddenly. And then a small country may discover that its size need not define its fate, just as a continent may discover that decline need not define its future. That is the power to shape the future. Not the illusion of controlling history, but the will to shape it.

Thank you.«

https://www.gov.si/novice/2026-08-31-janez-jansa-na-blejskem-strateskem-forumu-evropa-mora-svojo-prihodnost-oblikovati-sama