

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and UNSC resolutions in Iran: E3 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, March 2026

5.3.2026 - | Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) delivered a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board on Iran's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement and the implementation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

Chair,

The E3 have consistently advocated for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We have urged Iran to seek a negotiated solution and to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Let me reiterate that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom did not participate in the strikes on Iran but stand ready to take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region.

We extend our support and solidarity to all our regional partners and condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region in the strongest terms. We want to see the swiftest possible resolution that ensures security and stability for the region. We will continue to call for a diplomatic solution that fully and sustainably addresses nuclear and regional concerns.

In this context, we thank the Director General for his latest reports and for the Agency's tireless efforts to ensure the implementation of safeguards in Iran. We reiterate our full support for the Agency's professional, independent, and impartial work which remains indispensable to preserving confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities worldwide.

The Director General's reports remind us that this Board has been calling for progress from Iran for years. Iran has continually ignored demands to comply with its safeguards obligations despite repeated resolutions adopted by this Board and by the UN Security Council.

In June 2025, this Board found Iran to be non-compliant with its safeguards agreement following years of Iran failing to provide the IAEA the information and access it needed to resolve questions around the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran. At that time, Iran was neither fully engaging with the IAEA nor responding to the Agency's or the Board's concerns.

Chair,

As the DG's reports set out, the military interventions in June 2025 led the IAEA, rightly, to withdraw inspectors to ensure staff safety. We remain deeply concerned that the IAEA has been unable to access several of Iran's nuclear facilities, including those that pose the greatest nuclear proliferation risk, and account for Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium for more than eight months. This marks a continuing failure on Iran's part to adhere to basic safeguards obligations.

As the DG has reported, Iran has not provided the Agency with the requested report on affected nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material and consequently, the Agency cannot verify the status of the facilities and material and is unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities.

The DG's report also reminds us that in light of Iran's failure to address unresolved safeguards issues, the Agency has outstanding concerns about the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

We commend the DG and the IAEA for their efforts to engage Iran and reach a solution. We also thank the Agency for repeatedly reminding the Board that the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances.

Cooperation between the Agency and Iran – or indeed, between the Agency and any of its Member States – cannot be made conditional on factors outside of legal obligations under the NPT. To do so would undermine the integrity of the safeguards system and jeopardise the global non-proliferation regime on which all our security depends. This Board must continue to support the IAEA's efforts to resolve these issues.

Chair,

We have repeatedly expressed our deep concern about the lack of transparency over the nature of Iran's nuclear programme, including enrichment activities with no credible civilian justification. As the report points out, Iran remains the only State without nuclear weapons to have produced 60% High Enriched Uranium. We recall that Iran is legally required under the reinstated UNSC resolutions to suspend all its activities related to uranium enrichment.

It is therefore extremely concerning that the Agency is unable to account for Iran's uranium stockpile, including high enriched uranium equivalent to more than ten IAEA "significant quantities", and must rely on commercially available satellite imagery to report movement at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan.

After more than 8 months of frustration, the DG now reports increasing risk of diversion, particularly around Iran's new Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP). He notes with 'increasing concern' that the Agency has not been granted access to this location and is unable to confirm the nature and purpose of the activities observed around the entrance to the tunnel complex at Isfahan. The report clearly does not discount the possibility that this enrichment plant was already operational and potentially enriching material stored in Isfahan at the time of writing.

We must not lose sight of these proliferation risks in Iran and the challenges this poses to the global non-proliferation architecture.

Chair,

Finally, I want to reiterate that the E3 have consistently pursued negotiations and continue to believe that diplomacy offers the only sustainable path to finally resolving international concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. We urge Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

The E3 remain committed to diplomacy and to working with all Board members to uphold the authority of the IAEA and the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime.

Thank you, Chair

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/implementation-of-the-npt-safeguards-agreement-and-uns-c-resolutions-in-iran-e3-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-march-2026>